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ABSTRACT: Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) adopt the look of medical
practicesFcomplete with workers in scrubs, ultrasound machines, and invasive
physical examsFto deceive pregnant women into thinking they are being treated
by licensed medical professionals. In reality, CPCs offer exclusively Bible-
based, non-objective counseling. Numerous attempts to regulate CPCs have
faced political roadblocks. Most recently, in NIFLA v. Becerra, the Supreme
Court held that state efforts to require CPCs to disclose that they are not
.ediHallW liHensed are unH,nstituti,nal 'i,lati,ns ,f !6!s’ Pirst #.end.ent
right to free speech. In the wake of that decision, pregnant women in crisisFa
disproportionate percentage of whom are low-income women, minority women,
or women in vulnerable or dangerous situationsFcontinue to be subject to
!6!s’ ide,l,giHal .arAetingS .as)uerading as .ediHal ad'iHe.
This Article employs tort laZ t, ,ffer a n,'el ZaW t, regulate !6!s’ deHe*ti'e
practices. It proposes that women who submit to physical exams or ultrasounds
under !6!s’ false *retenses H,uld suHHessfullW raise a batterW Hlai.. TCe
intimate touching of a woman would most certainly be considered objectively
offensive, and while the woman might technically consent to the touching, this
consent is meaningless if it is based on misrepresentations. Contrary to popular
understanding, the touching need not be intentionally malicious or result in
physical injury to the plaintiff.
This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides a
practicable, novel solution to an urgent and timely issue. By relying on private
Hauses ,f aHti,nS tCis #rtiHle’s *r,*,sal sideste*s tCe collective action problems
and political willpower obstacles that have long hampered larger-scale attempts
t, regulate !6!s. It *laHes tCe inBured Z,.an in tCe dri'er’s seat and all,Zs Cer
to be compensated for the dignitary harm imposed when CPCs use deception to
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gain access to her body. Second, this Article contributes to robust literatures in
torts, informed consent, and medical ethics by reinforcing an increasingly blurry
line between medicine and pseudo-medicine. Informed consent means
something; it is not merely a vehicle through which ideology can be shoehorned.
Where CPCs are not licensed, they should be sued for battery, which honors the
indi'idual’s dignitW and is n,t deferential t, an industrW standard ,f Hare.
Physicians should be allowed to have political voices. So, too, should pro-life
activists. But each should have their policy debates, and win or lose them, in the
political sphere. It does violence to the physician-patient relationship, and the
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INTRODUCTION
Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) are nonprofit agencies that purport to
provide free services to women who are considering terminating their
*regnanHies. N,Ze'erS tCeir D*ara.,untS and tW*iHallW undisHl,sedS .issi,n is
t, H,n'inHe Z,.en n,t t, Ca'e ab,rti,ns.31 CPCs engage in deliberate efforts to
mislead pregnant women.2 They hold themselves out as secular medical
1. Kathryn Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and
Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 U. MI. L. REV. 592, 592 (2013).
2. DPalse and .isleading ad'ertising bW HliniHs tCat d, n,t provide abortions, emergency
contraception, or referrals to providers of such services has become a problem of national importance.
This issue has been the subject of a congressional report and proposed federal legislation . . . . The
congressional report f,und tCat Hertain *regnanHW res,urHe Henters 2fre)uentlW fail t, *r,'ide .ediHallW
aHHurate inf,r.ati,n’ and tCat 2tCe 'ast .aB,ritW ,f *regnanHW Henters’ H,ntaHted during tCe in'estigati,n
misrepresented the medical consequences of abortion. The report furtCer H,nHluded tCatZCile 2\t[Cis taHtiH
.aW be effeHti'e in frigCtening *regnant teenagers and Z,.en and disH,uraging ab,rti,n \S[’ it 2denies
[them] vital health information, prevents them from making an informed decision, and is not an accepted
publiH CealtC *raHtiHe.’3 See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017). See also
B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 64 (2015)
UDIu.er,us re*,rts Ca'e indiHated tCat s,.e !6!s use deHe*ti'e taHtiHs t, dissuade Z,.en fr,.
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providers, claiming in their advertising to counsel pregnant women on the full
range of their reproductive options. CPCs buy Google ad-Z,rds liAe Dab,rti,n
ser'iHes33 to direct people to their facilities. Their websites feature images of
nurses wearing scrubs and standing in front of ultrasound equipment.4When you
visit the CPC, its lobby resembles that of a health clinic.5 CPCs have names like
D7bria MediHal !liniHs3 ,r tCe D"aAersfield 6regnanHW !enter.36 The exam
rooms resemble those of d,Ht,rs’ ,ffiHes. Before you see a volunteer, you are
asked to fill out paperwork, channeling the procedure you would experience
before seeing a doctor. To complete the presentation that this is a medical
facility, some CPCs even refer t, tC,se ZC, seeA tCeir ser'iHes as D*atients.37
Given this quite deliberate staging, one would be forgiven for thinking that
CPCs are ordinary medical clinics. However, CPCs have a different purpose,
which is primarily to counsel against abortion.8 They are different in terms of the
training and licensure their staff is required to receive, which is usually none.9
They are different in terms of the privacy and safety standards that are imposed
upon them by law, which are few.10 As of June 2018, they are different in terms
choosing abortion, such as providing false information about the risks and effects of abortion, providing
false information about the law and availability of abortion, and telling women that their pregnancies are
more advanced than they really are.3).
3. Press Release, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, In Response to NARAL Pro-Choice America,
Google Removes Deceptive Anti-Choice Ads from Search Engine (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.prochoice
america.org/media/press-releases/2014/pr04282014_google_cpc.html [https://perma.cc/WB8H-9E5L]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Press Release, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, 66,608 Americans
Call on Yellowpages.com and Superpages.com to Stop Allowing Deceptive Anti-Abortion Ads (July 6,
2010), http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/07/07/66608-americans-call-yellowpagescom-an
d-superpagescom-stop-allowing-deceptive [https://perma.cc/WRU3-LXAH] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
4. D/ellS tCeW are ad'ertising tCe.sel'es. I l,,Aed at ,ne -- a few of them. An exemplary of this
is tCe Pallbr,,A 6regnanHW 4es,urHe !enter Zebsite. #nd it’s -- I’. fairlW s,*CistiHated -- there is a
woman on the home page with a uniform tCat l,,As liAe a nurse’s unif,r. in fr,nt ,f an ultras,und
.aHCine. It sC,Zs an eXa. r,,.. TCe teXt ,f tCe *age titled 2#b,rti,n’ saWs Pallbr,,A Zill eduHate Hlients
about different abortion methods available, and describe in medical terms different abortion procedures.
The website also says clients will be evaluated by nurses and that they follow all HIPAA regulations,
ZCiHC if tCeW’re n,t a .ediHal *r,'iderS tCeW d,n’t Ca'e t, f,ll,Z If a reas,nable *ers,n H,uld l,,A at tCis
Zebsite and tCinA tCat W,u’re gi'ing .ediHal ad'iHeS Z,uld tCe unliHensed n,tiHe be Zr,ng$3 7ral
#rgu.ent at @>:>>S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@ U?Q@9T UI,. @;-
1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
5. Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed Decision Making, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 934 (2013).
6. See OBRIAMEDICAL CLINICS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, https://omcsocal.org/ [https://perma.
cc/4G86-RT5W] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018); BAKERSFIELD PREGNANCY CENTER, http://www.bpc
partners.org/ [https://perma.cc/9W7X-UC9C] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018).
7. D\#lternati'es/,.en’s !enter[ refers t, tC,se ZC, seeA its ser'iHes as 2*atients.’3 #/,.an’s
Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, ;;8 P. #**’X
495 (9th Cir. 2016).
8. Danielle Lang, Truthful but Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State
Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353, 1390
(2014).
9. Most CPCs are unlicensed facilities and are staffed by volunteers who are not licensed medical
professionals. Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met Their Match: California’s
Reproductive FACT Act, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 83 (2017).
10. Given that CPCs are not considered professional medical providers, they would not be
subjected to medical malpractice, and held to a professional standard of care, for their negligence. Instead
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of the First Amendment protection they are afforded, which is considerably more
than that afforded to medical clinics. And, because of all of this, they are different
in terms of their lack of accountability when they injure women. Actual medical
clinics have safety, training, and compelled disclosure requirements that do not
apply to pseudo-clinics like CPCs.
CPCs are typically funded by Christian organizations as well as state and
local governments.11 In some cases, CPCs are subsidized by federal block grants
that were developed to aid poor families.12 The counseling CPCs provide is
exclusively pro-life and D"ible-based.313 Many CPC volunteers see their job as
a religious ministry or calling to do whatever is necessary to convince women to
carry their pregnancy to term.14
There have been several investigations of CPCsFsome from the ivory halls
of Congress and some from the glossy pages of Cosmopolitan magazineF
revealing widespread deceptive CPC practices. In one instance, after asking a
pregnant woman to submit urine for a pregnancy test, the staff then spent 45
minutes going over Bible verses, adoption options, and inaccurate descriptions
,f tCe e.brW,’s de'el,*.ent in ZaWs tCat Z,uld Cu.aniVe tCe fetus. TCe
pregnant woman recounted how D\t[Ce nurse reallWS reallW sl,Zed d,Zn during
tCe fetal *ain *art. SCe saidS 2\C[ere are tCe fingerti*s. TCe babW feels e'erWtCing
W,u’re feeling . . . .315 During the sonogram, the nurse said the images were not
tCeW Z,uld be Celd t, tCe l,ZerS D,rdinarW3 negligenHe standard. #dditi,nallWS tCe .anW state and l,Hal
safety ordinances that apply to health clinicsFthat regulate facilities, licensure, and staffingFdo not
apply to CPCs. Finally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires that health care
providers receive authorization before sharing protected health information with a non-covered entity. See
45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (West 2018). Oi'en tCat !6!s are n,t DH,'ered entitiesS3 tCe *ri'aHW *r,teHti,ns
HIPAA affords would not protect pregnant women who visit CPCs, unless the CPC voluntarily complies
with HIPAA (which could not be enforced by the U.S. government).
11. D\4eal #lternati'esS a !6!S Cas[ ad'ised Pl,rida, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota in
establishing state-financed anti-ab,rti,n HentersS and it Cel*ed establisC TeXas’s .ulti.illi,n-dollar
*r,gra.S ZCiHC runs ,n tCe sa.e .,del \as 6ennsWl'ania’s[. In ?Q@=S 4eal #lternati'es Z,n a n,-bid
contract t, ,*erate MiHCigan’s burge,ning *r,gra..3 MeagCan /interS What Some Pregnancy Centers
Are Really Saying to Women with Unplanned Pregnancies, COSMOPOLITAN (July 14, 2015),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a43101/pregnancy-centers-august-2015/ [https://perma.cc/8
Q5T-XG7S] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
12. ThinkProgress issued a report in 2016 that revealed that many CPCs are funded, in part,
through state welfare programs. See Bryce Covert & Josh Israel, The States that Siphon Welfare Money
to Stop Abortion, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/tanf-cpcs-ec002305dd18/
#.jllccm8ij [https://perma.cc/GU2R-J6RE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
13. See, e.g., THE AM. ASS’N OF CHRISTIAN COUNSELORS, https://www.aacc.net [https://perma.
cc/BUF3-TWE8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). See also Callie Beusman, How Anti-Abortion Zealots Pose
as Medical Professionals to Trick Pregnant Women, BROADLY (May 30, 2017), https://broadly.vice.com/
en_us/article/pae9ak/how-anti-abortion-zealots-pose-as-medical-professionals-to-trick-pregnant-women
[https://perma.cc/6DVR-2LUG] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
14. See, e.g., PRESBYTERIANS PRO-LIFE (PPL), http://www.ppl.org/index.php/ministry-equipping/
ministry-development/crisis-pregnancy-ministry [https://perma.cc/3BDN-Y7HZ] (last visited Nov. 19,
2018).
15. Winter, supra note 11. There is no evidence that a 6-8 week fetus can feel pain. María J.
Mayorga-Buiza, Letter to the Editor, Can Fetus Feel Pain in the Second Trimester? Lessons Learned from
a Sentinel Event, 34 CHILD NERVOUS SYSTEM 195, 195 (2018). Even so, CPCs share this inaccurate
information with pregnant women.
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clear and she needed to do a transvaginal ultrasound. According to the woman,
tCe nurse Ddidn’t eX*lain anWtCing ,r saWS 2/e’re g,ing t, stiHA tCis H,ne inside
W,u.’316
In another instance, a Manhattan CPC kept delaying the return of a pregnant
Z,.an’s lab,rat,rW results. TCe !6! insisted sCe return week after week for
various and vague reasons. When this woman became agitated about the delays,
sCe Zas inH,rreHtlW t,ld Dn,t t, Z,rrW beHause sCe H,uld get an ab,rti,n in IeZ
^,rA at anW ti.e.317 She eventually went to an obstetrician in severe distress,
seeking a late-term abortion that was no longer legal and no longer possible. She
sobbed with her obstetrician, who felt powerless to help her.
While these instances may constitute fraud, in many cases the counseling
takes on a subtler form of deception. Staff are instructed to use fear tactics and
to provide medically unsound information, such as claiming that undergoing an
abortion heightens the risk of breast cancer or decreases a Z,.an’s fertilitW.18 In
some states, legislatures have cooperated with pro-life organizations to create
.andat,rW disHl,sure Dinf,r.ed H,nsent3 laZs tCat re)uire *CWsiHiansS but n,t
CPCs, to provide clinically inaccurate information19 (such as the above comment
tCat in tCe first tri.ester DtCe babW feels e'erWtCing W,u’re feeling.3T. These
informed consent statutes have been referred to as targeted regulation of abortion
*r,'idersS ,r DT4#63 laZs.
Informed consent TRAP laws have been largely upheld as constitutional
regulations on professional speech. One of the key issues that this Article will
address is the disparate treatment of licensed and unlicensed medical providers
in the context of abortion. While physicians can be compelled to provide
medically inaccurate or misleading information to patients because they are
professionals, CPCs cannot be so compelled, because they are not professionals.
This paradoxical treatment leaves pregnant women vulnerable to harm and
obscures the distinction between medicine and pseudo-medicine.
16. Id.
17. Dr. Anne Davis, MD, Remarks at Medical and Legal Aspects of Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws Symposium (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leH4_
ODKoLA [https://perma.cc/5X64-5AQC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (speaking about a patient she saw
in IeZ ^,rAS ZC, Zas re*eatedlW t,ld tCat sCe H,uld Dget an ab,rti,n at anW ti.e in IeZ ^,rAS and t,
Aee* H,.ing baHA t, tCe !6!.3T.
18. D\7ne studW f,und[ tCat a**r,Xi.ately 87% of the centers contacted provided false or
misleading information about the health effects of an abortion, including information about a link between
abortion and breast cancer, the effect of abortion on future fertility, and the mental health effects of
abortion. The second report cited was a January 2008 report by the NARAL ProGChoice Maryland Fund.
NARAL sent volunteers into [CPCs] in Maryland, including Centro Tepeyac, and found that every center
visited provided false or misleading information, inHluding 2false inf,r.ati,n ab,ut ab,rti,n risAsS
.isleading data ,n birtC H,ntr,lS and e.,ti,nallW .ani*ulati'e H,unseling.’3 Te*eWaH '. M,ntg,.erW
Cty., 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 749 (D. Md. 2014).
19. See generally Lois Shepherd and Hilary Turner, The Over-Medicalization and Corrupted
Medicalization of Abortion and its Effect on Women Living in Poverty, 46 J. LAWMED. & ETHICS 672
(2018); see also Michele Goodwin, The Pregnancy Penalty, 26 HEALTHMATRIX 17, 19 (2016).
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To be sure, not every woman is tricked by CPC tactics.20 At some point, a
woman may realize the advice she is receiving is peculiar: it is not balanced,
secular, or objective, as it should be.21 SCe.igCt tCen H,nHlude tCat tCis DHliniH3
is really an elaborate theatrical set for deception. However, because CPCs target
under-insured, under-educated, and low-income women,22 they often encounter
women who are not as equipped to ferret out the pseudo-clinical from the
clinical. Indeed, low-income women of color might be particularly familiar with
tCe *ubliH s,Hial Budg.ent tCat Cas H,.e ZitC .anW ,f tCeir life DHC,iHes.323
These women unfortunately may be accustomed to receiving patronizing and
directive counseling from someone who should be unbiased and neutral. It makes
sense then, that undercover investigations have documented that many pregnant
women who visit CPCs actually think that the advice they are receiving is
medical and measured against an industry standard of care.
TCe H,nse)uenHes ,f tCis .isinf,r.ati,n f,r tCe *regnant Z,.an’s CealtC
are astronomical, as the CPC postpones necessary clinical treatment. Treatment
during pregnancy is extremely time-sensiti'eS and D\p]rompt obstetric
interventions are crucial to prevent intrapartumErelated fetal hypoxic injury and
maternal morbidity and m,rtalitW ass,Hiated ZitC ,bstetriH e.ergenHies.324
Pregnant women can have significant health risks that, if undetected, can lead to
the death of the woman, the fetus, or both.25 Of course, receiving pseudo-clinical
20. DThis is B.S., Nicole kept thinking, but you’re trying to make me think it’s true . . . . Some
women arrive at those centers in search of Christian counseling or free diapers, but the vast majority are
looking for professional advice to help them navigate unplanned pregnanHies.3 /interS supra note 11.
(emphasis in original).
21. See Thomas R. McCormick, Spirituality in Medicine, Ethics in Medicine University of
Washington School of Medicine (Apr. 2014), https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/spirit.html
[https://perma.cc/HC3D->>]1[ UD\6[r,fessi,nal etCiHs re)uires *CWsiHians t, n,t i.*inge tCeir beliefs ,n
patients who are particularly vulnerable when seeking CealtC Hare.3T.
22. DCPCs specifically target low-income communities, minority populations, and places with
young, vulnerable womenS liAe CigC sHC,,ls and H,lleges.3 "rittanW #. !a.*bellS The Crisis Inside Crisis
Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom,
37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 76 (2017). See also Shepherd, supra note 19, at 677.
23. D\6[,,r Z,.en’s *ri'ate li'es are .ade a'ailable f,r state sur'eillanHe and *r,ble.atiVati,n .
. . *ri'ate inf,r.ati,n ab,ut Z,.en’s CealtC and economic statuses is gathered and recorded. Their diets
are quantified and censured.Their histories with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and any
form of contact with the state are considered significant and relevant. In essence, a poor, pregnant
Z,.an’s *ri'aHW interestFthat is, her interest in preventing the government from intruding into her
personal, intimate affairsFCas been 'i,lated.3 KCiara M. "ridgesS Poor Women and the Protective State,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 1619, 1622G23 (2012).
24. G. Justus Hofmeyr et al., Obstetric Care in Low‐Resource Settings: What, Who, and How to
Overcome Challenges to Scale Up?, 107 INTL. J. GYN. & OBSTET. S21, S21 (2009).
25. Andrew Healy et al., Early Access to Prenatal Care: Implications for Racial Disparity in
Perinatal Mortality, 107 OBSTET. & GYN. ;?<S ;?< U?QQ;T UDThe establishment of regularly scheduled
medical visits for pregnant women represents one of the most important advances in obstetric care in the
*ast HenturWS and its r,le in reduHing fetal deatC is Zell establisCed.3T. See also Pregnancy and Prenatal
Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/health
communication/toolstemplates/entertainmented/tips/PregnancyPrenatalCare.html [https://perma.cc/2DC
L-XXN9] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) UDEaHC WearS re*,rts ,f a**r,Xi.atelW <QQ Z,.en who died as a
result of a pregnancy-related complication are received by the Division of Reproductive Health at CDC.
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Hare als, Be,*ardiVes a Z,.an’s trust and confidence in the larger health care
establishment, as the clinic is no longer exclusively a place for objective health
information. This can negatively affect her relationship with medical providers
for the rest of her life.
The explosion of CPCs has been attributed to Birthright International, a CPC
network organization that was founded in 1968 and has over 400 chapters on
three continents.26 Most CPCs in the United States are linked with an umbrella
organization such as Birthright, Care Net, Heartbeat International, or the
Iati,nal Institute ,f Pa.ilW and Jife #d',Hates UDIIPJ#3T. These umbrella
organizations are Christian and provide leadership and support to thousands of
CPCs. NIFLA, for example, states on its website that it is a
Christian ministry that seeks to glorify God by proclaiming the sanctity of
human life, both born and unborn. Through the provision of legal resources
and counsel to charitable faith-based Pregnancy Resource Centers (PRCs)
and Pregnancy Medical Clinics (PMCs), NIFLA seeks to develop a network
of life-affirming ministries in every community across the nation.27
While these websites eventually disclose the religious mission of the CPCs, in-
person visits often do not provide the same transparent disclosure.
There are thousands of CPCs in the United States.28 This is a national, large-
scale campaign. Heartbeat International, a Christian organization that started out
as a tele*C,ne C,tline and de'el,*ed int, a sWste. ,f !6!sS HurrentlW Dser'es
1,800 affiliated pregnancy help locations, maternity homes, and non-profit
ad,*ti,n agenHies ,n all ; inCabited H,ntinents.329 In the United States, CPCs
now outnumber abortion clinics 3-to-1, though this number is likely an under-
estimate.30 In some states, the ratio is more like 10-to-1.31
There are probably up to 500 additional such deaths that are not identified as being caused by
*regnanHW.3T.
26. See Discover Birthright, BIRTHRIGHT INT’L, http://birthright.org/learn/ [https://perma.cc/5447-
NVCP] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Chen, supra note 5, at 935-36.
27. About NIFLA, NIFLA, https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/JUG5-6TM3] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018).
28. Laura Bassett, What Are ‘Crisis Pregnancy Centers,’ And Why Does The Supreme Court Care
About Them?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/crisis-pregan
cy-centers-supreme-court_us_5a09f40ae4b0bc648a0d13a2 [https://perma.cc/4ZZZ-QNM3].
29. Our Story, HEARTBEAT INT’L, https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/about/our-story [https://
perma.cc/J5K6-3UX2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
30. Jenny Kutner, How Crisis Pregnancy Centers are Using Taxpayer Dollars to Lie to Women,
SALON (July 14, 2015), https://www.salon.com/2015/07/14/how_crisis_pregnancy_centers_are_using_
taxpayer_dollars_to_lie_to_women/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQD-4X7A] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). This
number is difficult to confirm, given that many CPCs operate without a license. The number of CPCs is
likely even higher in many states.
31. Teddy Wilson, ‘Completely Intentional’: Fake Clinics Outnumber Abortion Providers 10 to 1
in Texas, REWIRE.NEWS (May 24, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/05/24/completely-intentional-
fake-clinics-outnumber-abortion-providers-10-1-texas/ [https://perma.cc/J3EG-2W9B] (last visited Nov.
19, 2018).
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While the stated missions of these organizations appear charitable, and
Z,.en benefit fr,. tCe !6!s’ *r,'isi,n ,f free dia*ers ,r *regnanHW testsS tCeir
practices are quite deceptive. Film documentaries, non-profit investigations,
investigative journalism, and a 2006 Congressional report, commissioned by
Senat,r /aX.an UtCe D/aX.an 4e*,rt3TS32 have demonstrated that the aim of
CPCs is to lure vulnerable, under-insured or uninsured women away from
abortion clinics.33 Given the ideological importance of their mission, CPC staff
openly endorse misleading women if it means that fewer abortions will be
performed.34 The success of CPCs depends on how many women they can
persuade to carry their pregnancies to term.
To further confuse pregnant women, CPCs are typically located just a few
blocks from clinics that do counsel on and provide abortions.35 Some CPCs have
bought the exact real estate where Planned Parenthoods were located after
aggressive TRAP laws forced the Planned Parenthood clinics to close their
doors.36 However, unlike the Planned Parenthood clinics, which are licensed and
thoroughly regulated as medical clinics, CPCs are often not so licensed.
Recognizing that many states could close the CPCs under statutes that require
health facilities and their staff to be licensed, NIFLA has assisted over 700 CPCs
in their conversion into licensed medical clinics.37 These conversions are a step
in the right direction, as additional safeguards come from the CPCs being
licensed. However, licensure has not completely halted the deceptive practices
32. SeeMINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV. REFORM, FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 6 (July 2006)
U*re*ared f,r 4e*.NenrW #./aX.anT.#t tCe !,ngress.an’s re)uestS tCe S*eHial In'estigations Division
evaluated twenty-three CPCs through anonymous telephone interviews and also reviewed website tactics
and advertising methods.
33. Unmasking Fake Clinics: An Investigation into California’s Crisis Pregnancy Centers,
NARAL PRO-CHOICE CALIFORNIA FOUND., www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/cpc-rep
ort-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G578-KQN8] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
34. DIf W,u d,n’t C,,A Cer rigCt aZaWS sCe Cangs u* ,n W,u./Cen sCe Halls and sCe saWs 2_, W,u
do aborti,ns$’ I saW 2#re W,u Halling f,r W,urself ,r are W,u Halling f,r W,ur friend$’...and Ze engage in
H,n'ersati,n."eHause if sCe Halls and saWs 2_, W,u d, ab,rti,ns$’ and I saW 2I,S’ HliHA. \TCe!6! direHt,r
*ant,.i.es Canging u* tCe *C,ne[. I’. trWing t, get her in the door. Take control of the conversation . .
. I d,n’t.ind tCe HritiHis.s ,f taAing H,ntr,l. 2TCat d,esn’t s,und fair.’/ell t,, bad03 12TH&DELAWARE
(Home Box Office 2010). See also JACKSON (Girl Friday Films 2016).
35. In another scene from 12th and Delaware, a CPC director conducts a training for volunteers
in which she emphasizes the value of proximity to a clinic that provides abortions. She tells volunteers:
D!learlW ,ur H,.*etiti,n is tCe ab,rti,n HliniH./e are aHtuallW ,n ,**,site sides ,f tCe street . . . . TCeW’re
n,t alZaWs sure ZC, tCeW’re Halling anWZaW.3 12TH & DELAWARE (Home Box Office 2010). See also
Holtzman, supra note 9, at 86.
36. These laws impose stringent requirements on abortion clinics that dictate such things as the
width of hallways, lighting requirements, square footage requirements for exam space, admitting
privileges for physicians at area hospitals, etc. Many clinics have had to close in the wake of these laws,
which was the intended effect. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Borrowing from Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine in Analyzing Abortion Clinic Regulations, 26 HEALTHMATRIX 41, 45 (2016); see also Rachel
Suppé, A Right in Theory but Not in Practice: Voter Discrimination and Trap Laws As Barriers to
Exercising A Constitutional Right, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 130 (2014). Following
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), many of these TRAP laws might be struck
down, but much damage in terms of patient access has already been done.
37. Chen, supra note 5, at 935G36.
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of CPCs. And, while many of the women who obtain services from CPCs assume
they are getting treated by health care professionals who are subject to all that
comes with that perception, the CPCs that remain unlicensed are not subjected
to the numerous health, safety, and privacy regulations that attend to the regular
practice of medicine.38 There is a great mismatch between the way CPCs present
themselves to the public and the way they have presented themselves to the
courts.
This Article will proceed in four parts. The first Section will discuss how
legislators have attempted to thwart deceptive CPC practices through mandatory
disclosure laws, and how these statutes have been successfully challenged on
First Amendment grounds. While state consumer protection statutes provide
fantastic a'enues f,r H,rreHting !6!s’ deHe*ti,nS tCeW Ca'e been bafflinglW
underutilized due to political pressure in conservative states. Local prosecutors
are not motivated to bring these consumer protection lawsuits against CPCs.
Therefore, the second Section makes the primary argument for a private remedy
in tort law. Rather than rely on under-enforced or constitutionally vulnerable
consumer protection regulation, this Article advocates for the use of the private,
intentional tort of battery to provide redress for the women who have been
physically touched by the CPCs and injured by their deceptive practices. There
are many advantages to this approach, which puts many injured women in the
dri'er’s seatS ,ffers tCe. .,neW da.agesS and d,es n,t re)uire legislati'e or
political cooperation. In Sections III and IV, this Article discusses how states
could, but do not, prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine without
a license, or for the use of FDA-approved devices in unapproved ways. Again,
due to the lack of political will to enforce these options, they are not likely to
provide an adequate remedy to most American women. The Article then
concludes with some forward-looking concerns about the ways that medical
informed consent has been hijacked by the pro-life movement. Contrasting how
tCe Pirst #.end.ent *r,teHts !6!s’ deHe*ti'e s*eeHC but is )uite li.ited in its
protection of the free speech rights of licensed medical providers, the Article
explores some concepts rooted in medical ethics. Namely, this Article
acknowledges and articulates a worrying trend in reproductive jurisprudence
which blurs the medical with the ideological, shoehorning politics through the
mouths of licensed medical providers and doing violence to the physician-patient
relationship.
38. In order to avoid state fines for the unauthorized practice of medicine, some CPCs have begun
requiring that their nurses and medical directors maintain active medical licenses.
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I. REGULATINGCPCS THROUGH LEGISLATIVELY-COMPELLEDDISCLOSURES
A. Legislators Pass Disclosure Requirements to Curb the Documented,
Deceptive Practices of CPCs
City and county legislators were understandably upset when the Waxman
Report and other local investigations revealed the extent to which pregnant
women were being misled by CPCs.39 Many cities and counties have passed
ordinances attempting to curb the deception of CPCs through mandatory
disclosure requirements.40 Typically, these ordinances required notices to be
placed in the CPC waiting rooms indicating that the clinic is not licensed, or
(more constitutionally infirm) stating that the CPC does not refer anyone to
abortion services.41 These types of disclosure requirements have been struck
down by the Fourth Circuit and, most recently, by the Supreme Court, for
requiring speech that is not narrowly tailored or necessary to fulfill a compelling
state interest.42 Given how much the recent Supreme Court opinion, NIFLA v.
Becerra, limits future restrictions on CPCs’ speech, it will be discussed in some
detail below.
39. Investigations in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
TeXasS and Virginia all Ca'e d,Hu.ented !6!s’ intenti,nallW .isleading *raHtiHes. NARALPRO-CHOICE
CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS: THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN
CALIFORNIA (2010), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Unmasking-Fake-
Clinics-The-Truth-About-Crisis-Pregnancy-Centers-in-California-.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ2X-PNHQ]
(last visited Dec. 25, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICEMD. FUND, MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
INVESTIGATIONS: THE TRUTH REVEALED (2008), https://maryland.prochoiceamericaaffiliates.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2018/04/crisispregnancycenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M9-WRKX] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS. & PRO-CHOICE MASS. FOUND., JUST BECAUSE
YOU’RE PREGNANT . . . LIES, HALF TRUTHS, AND MANIPULATION AT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN
MASSACHUSETTS (2011); NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND. & NAT’L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH,
DSHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER3: A REPORT ON THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND
PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY (2010), https://
www.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/cpcreport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RMJ-5TTN] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARALPRO-CHOICEN.C. FOUND., THETRUTHREVEALED: NORTHCAROLINA’S
CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2011), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/2011
NARAL_CPCReport_V05_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCD6-Z96F] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL
PRO-CHOICE TEX. FOUND., THE TEXAS D#LTERNATIVES TO ABORTION3 PROGRAM: BAD HEALTH
POLICY, BAD FISCAL POLICY (2011), http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=163224
[https://perma.cc/3QS8-D8EY] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018): NARAL PRO-CHOICE VA., CRISIS
PREGNANCYCENTERSREVEALED, PART II: AN INVESTIGATIVEUPDATEONVIRGINIACRISISPREGNANCY
CENTERS (2013); Press Release, NARAL Pro-Choice Mo. Found., Show Me Truth: NARAL Pro-Choice
Missouri Organizes a Community Protest Against Deceptive Health Practices at ThriVe St. Louis (Feb.
11, 2012) (on file with author).
40. Campbell, supra note 22, at 84.
41. Id.
42. Holtzman, supra note 9, at 79.
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B. CPCs Challenge Disclosures as Violations of Free Speech
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
#.end.entS *r,Cibits tCe enaHt.ent ,f laZs Dabridging tCe freed,. ,f
s*eeHC.343 !,nse)uentlWS g,'ern.ent Cas Dn, *,Zer t, restriHt eX*ressi,n
beHause ,f its .essageS its ideasS its subBeHt .atterS ,r its H,ntent.344 Laws that
re)uire s*eaAers t, H,..uniHate a *artiHular .essage UDH,ntent-based3 laZsT
Dare *resu.*ti'elW unH,nstitutional and may be justified only if the government
*r,'es tCat tCeW are narr,ZlW tail,red t, ser'e H,.*elling state interests.345
However, the Court has held that this does not apply when the government seeks
to regulate the commercial or professional speech of participants in the public
marketplace.46 In tCe *astS tCe Su*re.e !,urt DCas been ZarW ,f Hlai.s tCat
regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the
!,nstituti,n.347 The key question for regulating CPCs under the First
AmendmentS tCeref,reS is ZCetCer tCe !6!’s s*eeHC is ide,l,giHalS H,..erHialS
or professional.
An ,rdinanHe *assed bW "alti.,re’s HitW H,unHil re)uired !6!s t, disHl,se
tCat DtCe Henter d,es n,t *r,'ide ,r .aAe referral f,r ab,rti,n ,r birtC-control
ser'iHesS3 and tCe disHl,sure .ust be DZritten in EnglisC and S*anisCS3 DeasilW
readableS3 and DH,ns*iHu,uslW *,sted in tCe Henter’s Zaiting r,,. ,r ,tCer area
ZCere indi'iduals aZait ser'iHe.348 This was thus a content-based regulation, and
if the speaker were ideological, as opposed to commercial or professional, the
ordinance would need to satisfy strict scrutiny. A Baltimore CPC and the
Catholic archbishop of Baltimore challenged this disclosure requirement as
violating their free speech. A federal court in Maryland enjoined enforcement of
the ordinance after the Fourth Circuit remanded, demanding greater discovery.49
Baltimore County appealed this decision, but the appellate court has not yet ruled
on the matter.
In Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, a CPC challenged the Maryland
H,untW’s re)uire.ent tCat !6!s Zarn Z,.en tCat Dthe Center does not have a
liHensed .ediHal *r,fessi,nal ,n staff3 and DtCe M,ntg,.erW !,untW NealtC
Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
45. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
46. More will be said infra, at Section I.B.3 about the application of the Zauderer precedent to
CPCs speech. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
650G53 (1985).
47. See Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?>9@ U?Q@9T (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
48. Greater Baltimore Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
721 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2013).
49. The distriHt H,urt’s CastW deHisi,n Hann,t be eXHused bW its ruling tCat anW H,..erHial s*eeHC
regulated bW tCe 7rdinanHe 2is ineXtriHablW intertZined ZitC ,tCerZise fullW *r,teHted s*eeHCS’ tCus
triggering strict scrutiny. Id. at 287.
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CealtC Hare *r,'ider.350_es*ite aHAn,Zledging tCat DH,nteXt.atters3 and H,urts
.ust l,,A t, DtCe effeHt ,f tCe H,.*elled state.ent \,n tCe listener[S351 the
district court emphasized that the speech that was being regulated occurred not
on websites or thr,ugC ad'ertisingS but in tCe !6!’s Zaiting r,,.S and DZitCin
Centro Tepeyac’s f,ur ZallsS .uHC Hl,ser t, tCeir ide,l,giHal .essage.352 They
tCen struHA d,Zn tCe ,rdinanHes as 'i,lating tCe !6!’s free s*eeHC rigCts. TCe
Fourth Circuit found that, as content-based compelled speech, the county
ordinance failed to pass strict scrutiny.53
!alif,rnia’s 4e*r,duHti'e P#!T #Ht UDtCe P#!T #Ht3T54 fared better in the
lower federal courts, in part because it technically applied to all non-profit
community clinics offering pregnancy counseling offices, rather than just those
that are unlicensed or pro-life.55 In addition, the statute did not include any
language ab,ut tCe state’s *referenHe regarding ZCere Z,.en reHei'ed tCeir
pregnancy care, or that they were encouraged to see a licensed provider.56 The
stated aims were clearer as well: to make sure California women were apprised
of state-funded reproductive services in a timely fashion, and were made aware
of how to access them.57 TCe legislati'e findings aHAn,Zledged tCat Dpregnancy
deHisi,ns are ti.e sensiti'eS3 and s, tCe state.ust su**le.ent tCeir *ubliH CealtC
education with materials placed in the clinic offices.58
50. 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748 (D. Md. 2014).
51. Id. at 758.
52. Id. at 760.
53. 683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery
Cty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013).
54. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE §§ 123470-123473 (Deering 2018).
55. The Act did have exemptions for certain facilities, which, if not included, may have proved
fatal to the Act. The first exemption was for clinics operated by a federal agency, and was included so the
Act was not federally pre-empted. The second exemption Zas f,r HliniHs tCat *artiHi*ated in !alif,rnia’s
DPa.ilW 6lanningS #HHessS !areS and Treat.ent 6r,gra.3 UPa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.T. Id. § 123471(c). To
*artiHi*ate in tCe Pa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.S a HliniH .ust *r,'ide DtCe full sH,*e ,f fa.ilW *lanning . . .
ser'iHes s*eHified f,r tCe *r,gra.S3 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 24005 (Deering 2018), including
sterilization and emergency contraceptive pills. Id. § 24007.
56. It d,es see. ,ddS C,Ze'erS tCat tCe state interest in *r,teHting Z,.en’s CealtC Z,uld n,t all,Z
states to encourage women to see a licensed medical provider for their pregnancy care. Pregnancy is a
medical condition, with significant risk of complication and even death. It seems like an entirely legitimate
use ,f tCe states’ *ubliH CealtC *,liHe *,Zer to encourage women to be seen by someone who was
professionally trained and licensed.
57. DTCe legislature Zas H,nHerned ZitC Z,.en ZC, .aW n,t be aZare tCat Hertain CealtC ,*ti,ns
are available to them, and wanted to ensure women in California are informed of the full range of free and
low-cost services available to them when they make their reproductive decisions. In this way, the Act
.,re Hl,selW rese.bles inf,r.ed H,nsent Hases tCan deHe*ti'e ad'ertising Hases.3 See #/,.an’s Priend
Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’dS ;;8 P. #**’X =8<
(9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
123470 (Deering 2018).
58. # /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. Narris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1208 (E.D. Cal.
2015), aff’dS ;;8 P. #**’X =8< U8tC !ir. ?Q@;TS cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470(a)-UHT U_eering ?Q@9TS ZCiHC *r,'ide in *artS DUaT #ll !alif,rnia
women, regardless of income, should have access to reproductive health services . . . (c) Because
pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California must
supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In California, low-
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1. NIFLA v. Becerra in the Ninth Circuit
The Act contained two critical parts. The first part required any pregnancy
counseling center that was not licensed as a medical facility to conspicuously
place a notice in the entrance of the facility, at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches in
size and written in no less than 48-point type font, that stated that the facility
DZas n,t liHensed as a .ediHal faHilitW and Cad n, liHensed .ediHal *r,'ider.3
They were also required to post this statement on billboards and any advertising
materials for the CPC.59 Failure to comply resulted in a $500 fine for the first
offense, and $1,000 fines thereafter.60 This part of the Act will be referred to
Cereinafter as tCe DunliHensed disHl,sure3 *r,'isi,n.
The second part of the Act required licensed facilities to disclose that
California has free or low-cost state-funded family planning options.
Specifically, covered clinics must post in their waiting rooms, in printed
materials, or digitally at check-in that D!alif,rnia Cas *ubliH *r,gra.s tCat
provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning
services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care,
and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
H,untW s,Hial ser'iHes ,ffiHe at \insert tCe tele*C,ne nu.ber[.361 The stated
reas,n f,r tCe #Ht Zas !alif,rnia’s desire that women have immediate access to
!alif,rnia’s DH,.*reCensi'e fa.ilW *lanning ser'iHes and *regnanHW-related
care through the Medi-!al and tCe Pa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.s.362 This part of the
#Ht Zill be referred t, as tCe DliHensed disHl,sure3 *r,'isi,n.
A handful of California CPCs petitioned for an injunction, to prevent the
state of California from enforcing either part of the statute. They claimed that
both provisions violated their rights to free speech under the U.S. Constitution.
The district courts and Ninth Circuit denied the injunctions.63
Oi'en tCe state’s H,nsu.er and CealtC *r,teHti,n reas,ns f,r *assing tCe laZS
the Ninth Circuit held that the unlicensed disclosure survived strict scrutiny and
was viewpoint neutral.64 As for the licensed disclosure, the Ninth Circuit agreed
income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning services
and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs. However, only Medi-
Cal providers who are enrolled in the Family PACT program are authorized to enroll patients immediately
at tCeir CealtC Henters.3
59. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1) (Deering 2018).
60. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123473 (Deering 2018).
61. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (Deering 2018).
62. D"eHause *regnanHW deHisi,ns are ti.e sensiti'eS and Hare earlW in *regnanHW is i.*,rtantS
California must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In
California, low-income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family
planning services and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs.3
CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123470 (Deering 2018).
63. Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife #d'ocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016) rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@ U?Q@9T.
64. A few district courts found the licensed disclosure to be a regulation of professional, not
ideological speech, and therefore subject to heightened, but not strict, constitutional review. SeeMountain
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that this provision regulated professional speech, and thus was subject to (and
survived) intermediate scrutiny. As the Ninth Circuit was only applying
intermediate scrutiny to this part of the Act, it held that the compelled speech
need not be the least restriHti'e .eans neHessarWS and D\tCe n,tiHe[ d,es n,t
contain any more speech than necessary, nor does it encourage, suggest, or imply
that women should use those state-funded services. The Licensed Notice is
closely drawn to achie'e !alif,rnia’s interests . . . .365 According to the Court of
Appeals, the petitioners could not demonstrate likely success on the merits of
their First Amendment free speech claims for either part of the Act, so the
injunction was denied.66
The CPCs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in 2017, certiorari
was granted in NIFLA v. Becerra.67 The Court certified the question of whether
tCe #Ht’s H,.*elled s*eeHC re)uire.ents 'i,late !6!s’ rigCt t, free s*eeHC
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case would resolve the
conflict between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits as to how to classify the relevant
speech and the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. Oral arguments were heard
in the spring of 2018, and the opinion was issued in June of 2018.
2. The Supreme Court Protects CPCs’ Right to Deceive by Holding that
They are Not Medical Providers
The Supreme Court had a different interpretation of both the applicable
*reHedent and tCe statute itself. TCe .aB,ritW granted tCe !6!s’ inBunHti,nS
prohibiting enforcement of the Act.68 Justice Thomas wrote for the majority,
finding that both parts of tCe #Ht DliAelW 'i,lated3 tCe !6!s’ rigCt t, free
speech.69 The Court achieved this result by making a series of creative but
disingenuous moves. Each of these moves rested on the factually inaccurate and
easily disprovable assumption that the CPCs are not practicing medicine or
providing medical services.
4igCt t, JifeS InH. '. "eHerraS ;8? P. #**’X 9Q:S 9Q9 U8tC !ir. ?Q@:T% Ji'ingZell Med. !liniHS InH. '.
NarrisS ;;8 P. #**’X =8>S =8>-95 (9th Cir. 2016); A /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. NarrisS
153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, # /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. NarrisS
;;8 P. #**’X =8< U8tC !ir. ?Q@;T. See also Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 189 (4th
Cir. ?Q@>T UDTCe H,urt ,bser'ed tCat H,ntent-based speech regulations ordinarily are subject to strict
scrutiny, but that lesser degrees of scrutiny may apply where the speech at issue is, inter alia, commercial
,r *r,fessi,nal.3T.
65. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW & Life Advocates, 839 F.3d at 842.
66. D!alif,rnia Cas a substantial interest in tCe CealtC ,f its HitiVensS inHluding ensuring tCat its
citizens have access to and adequate information about constitutionally-protected medical services like
abortion. The California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not
be aZare ,fS ,r Ca'e aHHess t,S .ediHal ser'iHes rele'ant t, *regnanHW.3 Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife
Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 841 (9th Cir. 2016).
67. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. =;= U?Q@:T.
68. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
69. Id. at 2380.
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TCe H,rnerst,ne ,f *etiti,ner’s argu.ent Zas tCat !6!s Zere n,t .ediHal
providers and what they do is not considered a medical intervention. There is a
mismatch, then, between how CPCs present themselves before the Supreme
Court, and how they are presenting themselves to the public. It was this mismatch
that the state of California sought to rectify with its Act, by requiring CPCs to
disclose their true unlicensed nature. And, given that the case was resolved at the
preliminary injunction phase, without much fact-finding, it is this very mismatch
that the CPCs successfully exploited before the Supreme Court to deem their
speech more protected than that of a licensed physician.
Consider this telling exchange betZeen IIPJ#’s att,rneWS MiHCael ParrisS
and Justice Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was evidently trying to understand why
the state of California could not compel a CPC to offer accurate and non-
misleading medical information to pregnant women, something constitutionally
permissible under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.70
MustiHe Oinsburg: D"ut ZCW isn’t tCis als, inf,r.ed H,nsent$ . . . S,F
so that the patient will know what are the array of services available to
Cer$3
Michael Farris: D^,ur N,n,rS tCe ser'iHes *r,'ided bW ,ur liHensed
Henters are n,t .ediHal inter'enti,ns.371
6etiti,ner’s att,rneW H,nHeded tCat if tCe state ,f!alif,rnia H,nsidered!6!s
to be practicing medicine, they could prosecute them for the unauthorized
practice of medicine.72 N,Ze'erS IIPJ#’s att,rneW als, stated tCat tCeW d, n,t
think they are practicing medicine or providing medical interventions, despite
their stated compliance with HIPAA requirements that only apply to medical
covered entities, or their provision of pregnancy tests, counseling, exams, or
ultrasounds, any of which would constitute the practice of medicine in any
state.73 To reiterate, what the CPCs advertise themselves as providing, and what
they actually provide, should be considered medical services, interventions, and
tCe *raHtiHe ,f .ediHine in e'erW single 1.S. state. TCe !6!s’ definiti,n ,f DtCe
*raHtiHe ,f .ediHine3 finds n, su**,rt under anW eXisting state laZ.
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. 7ral #rgu.ent at Q@:<@S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pamily & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
72. 7ral #rgu.ent at @::>8S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
73. 7ral #rgu.ent at @8:<@S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. More
Zill be said ab,ut tCe unlaZful *raHtiHe ,f .ediHineS and tCe state’s abilitW t, *r,seHute !6!s under tCis
authority. See discussion infra Section IV.
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a. Is the CPC Speaking as a Commercial, Ideological, or Medical
Entity?
The classification of the speech is central for First Amendment analyses.
This is a particularly difficult task in the present case, as CPCs demonstrate
aspects of all three types of speech: commercial, professional, and ideological.
It is therefore no surprise that there was a conflict between the district courts
about how to classify the speech of CPCs. While the distinctions between each
type are not as clear as they once were, federal precedent has mostly assumed
that these categories were mutually exclusive.
If the CPCs were engaged in purely commercial speech, the statutes in
question would traditionally be subject to mere rational basis review.74 Under
rational basis, the state need only offer a plausible basis for the legislation that is
minimally connected to the Act. In effect, this means the CPCs would not be
given First Amendment protection when they are misleading consumers or when
the compelled speech serves to ensure the provision of accurate information.75
The main objective in the analysis of compelled H,..erHial s*eeHC is DtCe
*r,teHti,n ,f tCe H,nsu.er’s interest in tCe free fl,Z ,f trutCful H,..erHial
inf,r.ati,n.376
The Supreme Court has recently complicated these traditional distinctions a
bit, however, offering greater protection to some forms of commercial speech.
In Sorrell v. IMSS tCe !,urt a**lied DCeigCtened3 sHrutinW t, a Ver.,nt
consumer protection statute that prohibited data-miners and pharmaceutical
.anufaHturers fr,. selling ,r using a d,Ht,r’s *resHribing inf,r.ati,n.77
Understanding the information disclosure objective of commercial speech
regulation helps to explain Sorrell, where the Court found that restrictions on
commercial speech (rather than the more typical compelled speech) violated the
First Amendment.78 In this same case, Justice Breyer reminded the majority that
the courts should exercise caution before applying heightened scrutiny
DZCene'er suHC a *r,gra. burdens s*eeHC3 as tCis Z,uld frustrate se*arati,n ,f
*,Zers and Ddist,rt ,r under.ine legiti.ate legislati'e ,bBeHti'es.379 Even
though Sorrell was about restricting rather than compelling speech, this case can
be read as signaling an erosion of the typical deference afforded to state
consumer-protection statutes.
In tCe Hase ,f !alif,rnia’s P#!T #HtS federal H,urts a**lied tCe traditi,nal
framework for commercial speech. In First Resort v. Herrera, the Ninth Circuit
74. # /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. NarrisS @<> P. Su**. >d @@;9S @@88 UE._. Cal.
2015), aff’d, ;;8 P. #**’X =8< U8tC !ir. ?Q@;T.
75. The Central Hudson test informs the proper regulation of commercial speech.
76. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 426 (2001).
77. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 584-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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held that whether speech is H,..erHial Ddoes not hinge solely on whether the
\!6!s Ca'e[ an eH,n,.iH .,ti'e.380 Under this view, even speech that is
provided by volunteers can be classified as commercial as it is spoken in a
D.arAet*laHe3 f,r re*r,duHti'e ser'iHes. #nd if it is H,..ercial, the Act would
be a permissible regulation on the dissemination of false or misleading
statements.81
Professional speech, on the other hand, has traditionally been afforded
inter.ediate re'ieZ. TCis Zas Bustified beHause *r,fessi,nalsS DtCr,ugC tCeir
education and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that
tCeir Hlients usuallW d, n,t3 and tCat Hlients *ut DtCeir CealtC ,r tCeir li'eliC,,d
in the hands of those who utilize knowledge and methods with which [they]
ordinarily have little ,r n, fa.iliaritW.382 Intermediate review meant that the
regulation need not be the least restrictive necessary to further a compelling state
interest. As the Act applied both to licensed and unlicensed facilities, there was
at least some argument that the speech is not professional, particularly when it is
compelled by CPCs that have no professional or licensed staff.83 But given that
the CPCs presented themselves as medical providers, and did offer some
professional services such as diagnosing pregnancies and offering ultrasounds,
there was also an argument that they were engaged in professional speech. The
Ninth Circuit adopted this latter argument, finding the CPCs to be engaged in
professional speech.84
The Fourth Circuit disagreed even further and f,und !6!s’ s*eeHC t, be
ideological due to their pro-life agenda.85 This interpretation was bolstered by
the fact that the CPCs offered free services and products. Ideological speech is
afforded the greatest First Amendment protection. It is assumed that tCe state’s
purpose in compelling this speech is the most suspicious. Given this, restrictions
on ideological speech are subjected to strict scrutiny, and absent compelling state
interests, and a statutory scope that is narrowly tailored to address those state
interests, the restriction will fail.
The problem, of course, and the reason for the disparate treatment among
federal courts, is that CPCs exhibit aspects of commercial, professional, and
ideological speech. To the outside layperson, they appear to be a medical clinic,
80. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017).
81. Id. at 1273-74.
82. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS 9>8 P.>d 9?>S 9>8 U8tC !ir. ?Q@;TS rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@ U?Q@9T.
83. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (1999).
84. Iat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. =;=S @88 J. Ed.
2d 328 (2017), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138
S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
85. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir.
2013).
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but to the sophisticated courts and attorneys, who have access to much more
information about the mission and funding of CPCs, they are obviously
ideological. And while they usually do not charge for their services, they are still
at least partially commercial in that they are competing with licensed medical
providers in the marketplace to offer a reproductive service.
b. The Supreme Court Classifies CPC Speech as Ideological
While the classification was far from obvious, then, the Supreme Court
deHided t, treat !6!s’ s*eeHC as ide,l,giHal. It did so by largely ignoring the
way CPCs hold themselves out to the public and ignoring that much of what they
do is a professional service. It also distinguished between speech and conduct,
holding that precedent allowing greater regulation of professionals was targeted
at professional speech that is incident to a professional service. This proved
pivotal, as it allowed the Court to distinguish precedents upholding TRAP laws
and other compelled disclosures in the marketplace of licensed physicians.
3. The Unlicensed Disclosure Provision
Given that CPCs advertise to the public for services, the unlicensed
disclosure provision should have been uncontroversial. States have long
recognized an interest in promoting consumer protection and regulating
commerce to promote public health and safety. More specifically, the Supreme
Court has also recognized the importance of ensuring that consumers know
whether they are visiting a licensed medical provider.86 The state’s interest Cas
been H,nsidered str,nger tCan tCe indi'idual *raHtiti,ner’s freed,.s.87
Even if CPCs were not considered medical providers, regulations on
professional speech have often been upheld to protect consumers. The Court has
recognized that professi,nals Han be re)uired t, *r,'ide D*urelW faHtual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be
a'ailable.388 In Zauderer, the Court upheld a requirement that attorneys disclose
their contingency-fee payment structure to potential clients. The Court reasoned
that the
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal . . . [and] warning[s] or
86. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
87. Id.
88. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53
(1985).
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disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.89
In NIFLA, the majority stated that the Zauderer precedent did not apply
because Zauderer applied only to purely factual information. Here, the Court
stated tCat Dinf,r.ati,n ab,ut state-sponsored servicesFincluding abortion,
\are[ CardlW an 2unH,ntr,'ersial’ t,*iH.390 But this is where they reveal their
category error and confuse the speaker (ideological, controversial pro-life group)
with the speech (which is purely factual and should not itself be considered
controversial).91 The Court then claimed that even if Zauderer did apply,
C,Ze'erS tCe #Ht still failedS as tCe disHl,sures Zere DunBustified ,r undulW
burdens,.eS392 es*eHiallW as a**lied t, a !6!’s ad'ertising .aterials.93 They
did so by focusing on the cost of compliance to CPCs.
Even though the majority classified the speech as ideological and unduly
burdensome, it did not stop there. It decided to go further, and rejected the
distinction between professional and non-professional speech, questioning
lower-court analyses to the extent they applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.
TCe !,urt reas,ned tCat *r,fessi,nal s*eeHC is Da diffiHult Hateg,rW t, define
ZitC *reHisi,n.394 "W i.*,sing a liHensure re)uire.entS tCis Dgi'es tCe States
unfettered *,Zer t, reduHe a gr,u*’s Pirst #.end.ent rigCts.395
6erCa*s tCe .,st *uVVling *art ,f tCe .aB,ritW’s ,*ini,n Zas tCe
asW..etriHal finding bW tCe !,urt tCat tCe Car. t, *regnant Z,.en fr,. !6!s’
deception was imaginary, and the harm to the CPCs by enforcing the Act was
very real. In finding that the licensed disclosure provision was perhaps
res*,nding t, a D*urelW CW*,tCetiHal Car.S396 the Court ignored the briefing by
the state and its legislative findings in passing the Act, which documented the
extent to which women were being misled by CPCs. The legislature had provided
ample evidence of harm, which the Court ignored.97
89. Id. at 651.
90. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?>;: U?Q@9T.
91. Previously, the Court had acknowledged that different types of content might be treated
differently, even if still content-based and all subjected to strict scrutiny.
92. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
93. Id. at 2373-76.
94. Id. at 2375.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2377.
97. In finding tCat tCe Car. Cere.aW be D*urelW CW*,tCetiHalS3 and tCe disHl,sure unneHessarWS tCe
Court seems to be considering the availability of other state options for curbing deceptive practices, such
as the ability of the state to prosecute for the unlawful practice of medicine or under general state consumer
protection laws. However, the bill specified the harm the Reproductive FACT Act was meant to address,
namely tCat DIn ?Q@?S .,re tCan ?.; .illi,n !alif,rnia Z,.en Zere in need of publicly funded family
planning services. More than 700,000 California women become pregnant every year and one-half of
these pregnancies are unintended. In 2010, 64.3 percent of unplanned births in California were publicly
funded. Yet, at the moment they learn that they are pregnant, thousands of women remain unaware of the
public programs available to provide them with contraception, health education and counseling, family
planning, prenatal care, abortion, or delivery. Because pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care
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In contrast, the harm to the CPCs from having to comply with the Act was
H,nsidered bW tCe !,urt t, be DunBustified ,r undulW burdens,.e.398 The Court
tCen reas,ned tCat D\e['en if tCe State Cad *resented a n,nCW*,tCetiHal
BustifiHati,nS tCe P#!T #Ht undulW burdens *r,teHted s*eeHCS3 as D\i[t i.*,ses
a government-scripted, speaker-based disHl,sure re)uire.ent3 tCat a**lies
regardless of whether the CPCs disclose their non-licensed status on their
website.99 Of course, this assumes that everyone has access to these
advertisements before entering the CPC.
4. The Majority Places Much Consumer Protection Law at Constitutional
Risk
By describing the disclosure in this way, the Court cast too wide of a net,
rendering .anW H,nsu.er *r,teHti,n statutes unH,nstituti,nal. #s "reWer’s
dissent correctly points out, this aspect of NIFLA has the potential for sweeping
impact outside of the abortion context, as D'irtuallW e'erW disHl,sure laZ H,uld
be H,nsidered 2H,ntent basedS’ f,r 'irtuallW e'erW disHl,sure laZ re)uires
indi'iduals t, s*eaA a *artiHular .essage.3100
TCe .aB,ritW res*,nds tCat D\H[,ntrarW t, tCe suggesti,n in tCe dissentS Ze
do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial
*r,duHts.3101 But if the FACT Act is not considered a regulation to protect health
and safety, it is hard to imagine ZCat Z,uld be. TCe.aB,ritW’s ,*ini,n ,ffers n,
guidance on this score. Why is the Act not directed at protecting public health?
TCe !,urt’s H,nfusing reas,ning H,uld in'alidate .anW state regulati,nsS ,f
such things as cigarettes, securities, guns, or environmental pollutants, on First
Amendment grounds. States typically do not require non-polluters to state that
they are non-polluting, or that non-cigarettes do not contain nicotine. If passing
legislation that targets the deceivers is considered imper.issible Dg,'ern.ent-
sHri*ted3 H,ntent disHri.inati,nS tCen .uHC regulati,n ,f H,ntr,'ersial *r,duHts
,r industries Z,uld be unH,nstituti,nal. #nd tCe .aB,ritW’s general disHlai.er
tCat tCis is n,t ZCat tCeW .eant Dseem[s] more likely to invite litigation than to
*r,'ide needed li.itati,n and HlarifiHati,n.3102
early in pregnancy is important, California must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its
reproductive health programs. In California, low-income women can receive immediate access to free or
low-cost comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related care through the MediGCal and
tCe Pa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.s.3 See 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 700.
98. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
99. Id. at 2377.
100. Id. at ?>9Q U"reWerS M.S dissentingT. D\M[uHCS *erCa*s .,stS Cu.an beCa'i,r taAes *laHe
through speech and because much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the
.aB,ritW’s a**r,aHC at tCe least tCreatens H,nsiderable litigation over the constitutional validity of much,
*erCa*s .,stS g,'ern.ent regulati,n.3 Id.
101. Id. at 2376.
102. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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This holding is quite disturbing and far-reaching. CPCs create deceptive
advertising, and then cannot be required to correct it. Imagine if a gun
manufacturer misled consumers to believe that a gun could do things that it could
not do, or was safer than it was. Then, imagine the state passing a law requiring
tCe .anufaHturer t, H,rreHt tCis deHe*ti,n. 1nder tCe Su*re.e !,urt’s ,*ini,n
in NIFLA, the statute could be presumptively unconstitutional, as the subject
matter is controversial (guns) and the disclosure might cost the gun
manufacturers money. This would, of course, ignore the fact that it was the
actions of the gun manufacturers that created the deception in the first place. This
paradoxical outcome should be alarming to anyone concerned about deceptive
advertising.
5. The Licensed Disclosure Provision
The Supreme Court also found that the second part of the Act likely violated
tCe !6!s’ rigCt t, free s*eeHC. #s ZitC tCe unliHensed disHl,sureS tCe bulk of the
H,nstituti,nal Z,rA Zas d,ne ZCen it Hlassified tCe !6!s’ s*eeHC as ide,l,giHal
rather than professional. Recall that in Zauderer, professional speech could be
regulated for consumer protection.103
a. To Distinguish Casey, CPCs Deemed To Not Be Providing
Medical Services, and the Licensed Disclosure was Not Informed
Consent
TCe !,urt .ade it Hlear tCat tCe liHensed disHl,sure is n,t Dan inf,r.ed
H,nsent re)uire.ent ,r anW ,tCer regulati,n ,f *r,fessi,nal H,nduHt.3104 This is
because it is not tied t, tCe *r,'isi,n ,f a D.ediHal *r,HedureS3 and a**lies t, all
interactions between a CPC and a pregnant woman.105 Of course, this is a very
narrow reading of informed consent doctrine, as licensed doctors can be and have
been required to provide information to women that is disconnected from a
medical procedure. For example, when physicians provide information about the
likely side effects of medications, something they are legally required to do, this
disclosure would not be part of medical informed consent under the NIFLA
framework. Likewise, outside of the health care context, employers can be
required to post safety notices in their break-rooms that do not directly apply to
tCeir e.*l,Wee’s i..ediate H,nduHtS and restaurants tCat ser'e alH,C,l Han be
required to post notices about the risks of drinking alcohol, regardless of whether
a patron orders any alcoholic beverages. Never before have health disclosures
103. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
104. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
105. Id.
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needed t, be i..ediatelW tied t, tCe s*eaAer’s H,nduHt t, *ass Pirst #.end.ent
scrutiny.
The requirement that the health and safety disclosure be limited to those
instanHes ZCere a D.ediHal *r,Hedure3 is i..ediatelW t, be *erf,r.ed als,
reflects a very narrow, and incorrect, reading of what it means to practice
medicine. Under this definition, pediatricians, geriatricians, general
practitioners, infectious disease doctors, and many other specialties rarely
*raHtiHe .ediHine. TCese are H,nsidered DH,gniti'e3 s*eHialties ZCere
procedures are not typically performed, and instead health care is discussed and
monitored, and referrals are made. These physicians would almost certainly
dispute the idea that medical services are only rendered, and informed consent is
only required, when a procedure is about to be performed. To say that only
D*r,Hedures3 a.,unt t, .ediHal ser'iHes is bizarre and incorrect. It is also
dismissive of the large majority of health care providers, who never perform, or
bill for, any procedures, and yet who are still legally required to maintain a
license to practice medicine. Further, if a CPC provides medical services at any
point, which they do when diagnosing a pregnancy, conducting physical exams,
or performing ultrasounds, it should be deemed a medical clinic. There is no such
thing as a part-time or fractional medical clinic. After all, just because a
physician fills out forms for patients who want to play sports or paperwork for
insurance billing, these non-procedure activities do not render the clinic a non-
HliniH. It is H,.*letelW at ,dds ZitC tCe H,nHe*t ,f tCe D*raHtiHe ,f .ediHine3 t,
think of a medical clinic as only providing medical services when a physician is
cutting open a patient.
Of course, there was more to this rhetorical move than merely dodging
Zauderer. It was critical to find that CPCs were not practicing medicine in order
to distinguish the informed consent precedent specific to abortion. Casey made
it quite clear that the state could require providers to offer non-misleading and
accurate information as part of informed consent to abortion, and that this
requirement would not violate due process or free speech.106 But because the
Supreme Court did not view the CPCs as medical providers, they did not apply
Casey. The FACT Act disclosures, they reasoned, could be made in the lobby of
the pseudo-clinic, before any medical procedures were technically provided.
There was no medical procedure being performed yet, and because the CPCs are
not medical providers, there may never be any medical service provided.
Apparently, to the NIFLA majority, informed consent is only triggered moments
before an abortion procedure is about to be performedFand not as part of general
reproductive counseling.107 In oral argument, Justice Sotomayor recognized the
problemwith this, asking DC,Z’s \ZCat a!6! d,es[ different fr,.ZCat a d,Ht,r
106. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
107. This is surprising, as courts have held that providing women counseling and prenatal vitamins
constitutes the practice of medicine, to which regular tort law informed consent would attach.
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does? When you go in for a pregnancy, you see the doctor, and the doctor will
describe, hopefully, the benefits of a pregnancy and perhaps its risk because,
dependingFnot all pregnancies are without complications. So this is consulting
about a medical condition. How is that any different than Casey? You come in
to talk to anFa d,Ht,r ab,ut ab,rti,n.3108 IIPJ#’s att,rneW res*,nded tCat tCis
was different because Casey applied to doctors, and NIFLA is not a medical
*r,'ider. MustiHe S,t,.aW,r res*,ndedS Dn,Z W,u’re redefining .ediHine.3109
Indeed.
If the Court had focused on the reasonable perspective of the listener, and
analogized the CPCs to medical providers, it would have been fairly simple for
the Court to allow the disclosures as part of the proper regulation of medicine
and/or professional speech. It is patently unjust to allow CPCs to deceive women,
and then not allow states to correct this deception through disclosure
requirements that target the deception where it occurs.
With Zauderer and Casey out of the way, the Court still needed to
demonstrate that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. Here, the Court missed
a step by suggesting (but not finding) that the Act discriminated based on
viewpoint and interpreting any evidentiary ambiguity in favor of NIFLA. While
DtCe O,'ern.ent bears tCe burden ,f *r,,f ,n tCe ulti.ate )uesti,n [of the
statute’s[ H,nstituti,nalitWS3110 tCe !,urt Zas ,'erlW dis.issi'e ,f !alif,rnia’s
evidence regarding the need for tailoring its statute in the way that it did. Namely,
the Court dismissed the evidence that a public outreach campaign would be
ineffeHti'e and Z,uld lea'e .anW Z,.en 'ulnerable t, tCe !6!’s deHe*ti'e
practices.111
NIFLA argued that the Act discriminated based on viewpoint because it
exempted facilities that enroll patients in state-funded reproductive programs,
ZCiHC inHlude ab,rti,n. "W eXe.*ting tCese HliniHsS tCeW arguedS DtCe statute
unnecessarily imposes a disproportionate burden upon facilities with pro-life
'ieZsS tCe 'erW faHilities .,st liAelW t, find tCe statute’s referenHes t, ab,rti,n
108. Oral Argument at 14:55, Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
109. Id. at 17:00.
110. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
111. DTCe reH,rd als, sC,Zs tCe liHensed faHilities n,tiHe re)uire.ent is a**r,*riatelW tail,red t,
advance the interest of ensuring that pregnant women are informed about their health care options. Indeed,
the requirement is narrowly tailored. As the Legislature recognized, pregnancy decisions are time sensitive
and care early in pregnancy is critical. Thus, women need to be notified of available resources as soon as
possible. See Assem. Bill No. 775, § 1(a)-(d). The time-sensitive nature of pregnancy makes other policy
optionsFsuch as a statewide advertising campaign, for exampleFunavailable to the Legislature. As the
author of AB 775 stated, the most effective way to make sure that pregnant women obtain the information
and services they need during pregnancy in a timely way is to require a licensed health care facility to
provide the required notice, especially if the facility does not provide the full spectrum of health care
ser'iHes.3 _efendants’ 7**,siti,n t, 6laintiffs’ M,ti,n f,r 6reli.inarW InBunHti,n at >?S Iat’l Inst. ,f
Family & Life Advocates v. Kamala Harris, 2015 WL 13649183 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-
02277-JAH-DHB).
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.,rallW abC,rrent.3112 But, as Breyer points out in his dissent, the evidentiary
record was insufficient on this score. The district court found that the exemption
made sense beHause tCe eXe.*ted HliniHs D*r,'ide tCe entire s*eHtru. ,f
ser'iHes re)uired ,f tCe n,tiHe.3113 Absent discovery, there was no evidence that
the Act disproportionately and unfairly impacted CPCs. True, poor pregnant
women might visit exempt clinics, and they might benefit from the disclosure
that the state offers low-cost or free reproductive options. But there was nothing
in the record to suggest that the exempt clinics were not already providing this
information, as respondents claimed.114
The Court reasoned that if the state interest was in informing women that
state-funded public health options were available, California should have
required all clinics to disclose this availability, and not just those that fail to offer
the relevant services. In ,ral argu.entS tCe state’s att,rneW atte.*ted t, argue
that it limited the compelled speech to only those speakers necessitating the
disclosure. The Act could have been deemed over-inclusive if it had required
clinics providing abortion and contraception to advertise the availability of state-
funding for the same, without any evidence that this disclosure was necessary.
Indeed, in discussing the unlicensed disclosure, the NIFLA Court recognized that
DdisHl,sures \.ust[ re.edW a Car. tCat is 2*,tentiallW real not purely
CW*,tCetiHal’ and tCe re.edW .ust eXtend Dn, br,ader tCan reas,nablW
neHessarW.3115 The state of California argued that it targeted the CPCs because
that is where the deception existed, as there was no documented failure to inform
women of state-funded reproductive services by private clinics offering general
obstetric services. Regardless, the appearance of regulating a pro-life perspective
112. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?>99-89 (2018) (citing
Brief for Petitioners 31-37).
113. See Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS I,. @<!V??:: M#NU_N"TS ?Q@; /J
3627327, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff’d, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part sub
nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. =;=S @88 J. Ed. ?d >?9 U?Q@:TS and
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?Q@ J.
Ed. 2d 835 (2018), and rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '.
"eHerraS 8Q? P.>d 8QQ U8tC !ir. ?Q@9T. P,r defendants’ argu.ents ,n tCis *,int, see also _efendants’
7**,siti,n t, 6laintiffs’ M,ti,n f,r 6reli.inarW InBunHti,n at ?=-?<S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife
Advocates v. Kamala Harris, 2015 WL 13649183 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-02277-JAH-
_N"T. DTCe n,tiHe re)uire.ent is als, narrowly tailored to the stated interest of ensuring that pregnant
women are aware of the full spectrum of pregnancy-related health care services in California because the
specific language of the notice speaks to that entire spectrum. In other words, the notice does not simply
.enti,n 2ab,rti,n.’ 4atCerS tCe n,tiHe inHlusi'elW refers t, 2H,.*reCensi'e family planning services
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion f,r eligibleZ,.en.’
§ 123472(a)(1). To put it another way, the notice does not express a particular opinion or view, or make
a specific recommendation. It simply conveys the objective range of informationFn, .,re.3 Id.
114. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS 9>8 P.>d 9?>S 9==-45 (9th Cir. 2016); Nat’l
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377.
115. Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life AdvocatesS @>9 S. !t. at ?>:: UHiting IbaneV '. Pl,rida _e*’t ,f
Business & Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982);
accord Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); cf. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 649 (rejecting
Dbr,ad *r,*CWlaHtiH rules3 in tCis area)).
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led the Court, and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence,116 to find that this part of
the legislation was probably viewpoint discrimination, and, at the very least, was
DZildlW underinHlusi'eS3117 and thus failed strict scrutiny.118
C. NIFLA Allows Ideological Speakers to Deceive
The problem with classifying the speech of CPCs is that they are less
deceptive in the disclosures they provide online. After requiring several clicks,
the CPC website will state that they do not provide abortions and they counsel
from a pro-life, Christian perspective. However, many of the women seeking a
CPC’s services might never visit its website. If they do, they might not read the
fine print in the online disclaimers, or successfully click through the pseudo-
clinical content to get to their ideological disclosures. This disparity allows CPCs
to advertise as medical clinics but be regulated as ideologues.
In finding that the CPCs are ideological speakers, the Court ignored the
*ers*eHti'e ,f tCe listener. #s ,ne sHC,lar eX*lainedS DtCe state’s regulat,rW
authority may be triggered by the fact that an individual holds herself out as a
professi,nalS ZCetCer sCe is aHtuallW a *r,fessi,nal ,r n,t.3119 This suggests that
the clandestine intent of the speaker should not control. If the listener reasonably
believes, based on the objective manifestations of the speaker, that the speaker
is *r,fessi,nalS tCen tCe s*eaAer’s *ri'ateS seHreti'e ide,l,gW sC,uld not provide
for greater First Amendment protection. This view makes abundant sense if the
state’s interest in *assing tCe disHl,sure ,rdinanHe Zas t, *r,teHt H,nsu.ers.
Unfortunately, this is not the approach that the majority took in NIFLA.
Given how politicized access to abortion has become, it is no surprise that
the First Amendment has protected politicized speech around abortion services.
However, the NIFLA opinion goes further than necessary to protect deception.
In so doing, the opinion signals to legislatures that consumer protection statutes
cannot provide an effective remedy against CPCs’ deceptive practices. Even if
California gathered sufficient evidence that demonstrated the need to correct
!6!’s deHe*ti'e *raHtiHesS tCe state Z,uld still faHe the hurdle of this speech
being considered purely ideological. Further, the current Court sent strong
116. Id. at ?>:8 UKennedWS M.S H,nHurringT UDIt d,es a**ear tCat 'ieZ*,int disHri.inati,n is inCerent
in tCe design and struHture ,f tCis #Ht.3T.
117. Id. at ?>:< U)u,ting "r,Zn '. Ent.’t MerHCs. #ss’nS <;= 1.S. :9;S 9Q? U?Q@@TT.
118. Id. at 2375-76.
119. Hill, supra note 2 at ;? UDIn Lowe, the investment adviser had been de-registered and therefore
was no longer technically a licensed professional, but neither Justice White nor Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, seemed to consider this fact relevant to whether he was engaged in professional speech.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in considering whether a county could require fortune tellers to have permits
and pay fees in order to operate, applied professional speech standards, although the notion of including
fortune tellers in the same category as doctors and lawyers may, at first glance, seem to be a stretch. In
placing this label on the fortune-teller’s s*eeHCS tCe H,urt e.*CasiVed tCe *ers,naliVed nature ,f tCe Hlient
relationship and the special need for consumer protection, which meant that the state could require her
s*eeHC t, be liHensed.3T.
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signals that they would dismiss public health state interests as not being
sufficiently compelling. This indicates a tremendous amount of judicial
deferenHe t, tCe !6!s’ s*eeHC. If statesZant t, effeHti'elW Hurb !6!s’ deHe*ti'e
practices, they will need to pursue other avenues.
II. REGULATING CPCS THROUGH TORT LAW
A. Legal Tools Discussed Thus Far Require the Political Will of Elected
Officials
There are myriad legal tools in the arsenal of the state attorneys general or
legislators who would like to eliminate the misleading practices of pseudo-
clinics, such as CPCs.
The biggest disadvantage to the public consumer protection statutes that will
be discussed, infra, at Section IV, is that each requires the political will of elected
officials to prosecute CPCs. A private individual cannot prosecute a CPC that
deliberately misleads women, engages in the unauthorized practice of medicine,
or promotes unapproved uses of an FDA-approved device. Unfortunately,
elected officials, including county or state prosecutors, frequently choose not to
HCa.*i,n tCe rigCts ,f Z,.en ,r su**,rt Z,.en’s re*r,duHti'e HC,iHes. TCis
means that private women, especially those who live in conservative states,
cannot rely on these consumer protection statutes and regulations to challenge
the CPCs. Without a legal remedy, the rights these measures seek to protect are
meaningless.
B. Tort Law Puts the Injured Party in the Driver’s Seat
It is in this space, where something is either under-regulated or regulations
are under-enforced, that the law of torts does its best and most useful work. This
Article advocates that individual women should sue CPCs in tort law for the
intentional tort of battery. While this approach presents its own challenges
related to the emotional and financial burdens of litigation, as well as the fact
that the litigation comes after the harm has occurred, it still has significant
advantages over passively waiting for prosecution under consumer protection
statutes. T,rt laZ *uts tCe inBured *artW in tCe dri'er’s seat. In H,ntrast t, *ubliH
actions, which typically involve the remedy of injunctions, a battery lawsuit
allows the plaintiff to receive some compensation from the CPCs, which might
include punitive damages. Finally, it does not in any way undermine public
,ffiHials’ abilitW t, enf,rHe deHe*ti'e !6! *raHtiHes tCr,ugC ,tCer .eans. T,rt
law can work in tandem with public efforts to minimize the deceptive and
harmful practices of CPCs. But, when officials sit on their hands and allow
consumers to be deceived, torts are a terrific remedy.
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A tort claim would function something like the following. Any time that a
woman is touched by a CPC staff member, if the touching is only consented to
through deception by the CPC, she should be able to prevail on a civil battery
Hlai.."atterW C,n,rs tCe indi'idual’s dignitW and is n,t deferential t, an industrW
standard of care, unlike a case for medical malpractice, which would apply only
if the CPCs were licensed, professional health care providers.
Before explaining why the battery tort is such a great tool for women who
have been injured by a CPC to seek redress, this Article will discuss the history
and purpose behind this old intentional tort, and the ways in which TRAP laws
have perverted the doctrine of battery and informed consent. The use of battery
in this context might help redefine and reclaim this doctrine, to challenge the
frequent pro-life blurring of the medical with the ideological. Informed consent
means something; it is not merely a vehicle through which to shoehorn ideology.
C. The History of Battery and its Elements
The battery cause of action is one of the oldest torts, and has deep roots in
,ur H,..,n laZ’s desire to protect the personal dignity of individuals and their
ability to decide how, by whom, and under which circumstances they are
touched. This is one of the most basic rights in our common law. To make out a
civil claim of battery, a plaintiff must prove that each of these elements is more
likely than not to have occurred: (1) the defendant intentionally touched the
plaintiff (2) in a way that was objectively harmful or offensive and (3) the
plaintiff did not consent to the touching, nor was it privileged (say, as part of a
lawful police arrest).120
Pregnant women who were misled about the purpose of their visit to the CPC
may bring battery claims against the CPC staff who touched them in offensive
ways, violating their personal dignity.121 A pregnant woman who is examined by
a CPC volunteer and physically touchedFincluding having her pulse taken, but
especially undergoing a vaginal exam or ultrasoundFcould rather easily make
out a battery claim if she reasonably finds the touching offensive because she
consented to the touching under false pretenses.122 The minority of women who
are not touched by CPC staff, perhaps because they came in for counseling and
left before being seen by one of their volunteers, would not be able to bring a
battery claim. However, it is the physical touching and examination of pregnant
120. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 85 (2018).
121. W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, 41 (5th ed. 1984)
UDTCe ele.ent ,f *ers,nal indignitW in',l'ed alZaWs Cas been gi'en H,nsiderable ZeigCt. !,nse)uentlWS
the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those relatively
tri'ial ,nes ZCiHC are.erelW ,ffensi'e and insulting.3T% RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL
TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
122. Campbell, supra note 22, at 75 UDTCe nurse attempted an external ultrasound, but because she
claimed that the images were unclear, the nurse told Nicole she needed to perform a transvaginal scan
insteadS ZitC,ut eX*laining tCe intriHaHies ,f tCe *r,Hedure.3T.
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women that leads to the dangers this Article seeks to prevent, as the pregnancy
evaluations and exams are the pseudo-medical activities that create the false
sense that the pregnant women are being seen by licensed physicians. Where
women are only receiving pamphlets, there is less of a risk that they will delay
obtaining proper medical care as a result.
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove the CPCs Physically Injured Them
Contrary to popular understanding, the intentional touching need not bruise
or physically injure the plaintiff if the claim is for offensive touching.123 The
Dgrievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical
Car. d,ne t, Cis b,dW.3124 Examples of offensive touching include spitting in
s,.e,ne’s faHeS125 re.,'ing s,.e,ne’s CatS126 or tackling someone too
aggressively in a junior-high football league.127
Further, the plaintiff need not even be aware at the time that a battery took
*laHe. TCe insult t, tCe *laintiff’s integritW Dis as AeenlW felt bW ,ne ZC, ,nlW
knows after the event that an indignity has been perpetrated upon him as by one
ZC, is H,nsHi,us ,f it ZCile it is being *er*etrated.3128 Thus, a surgeon who
examines an anesthetized person without her consent could be liable for a
battery. So too could a man who kisses a woman, without waking her, while she
is asleep.129
2. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove that the CPC Had Malicious Intent
To satisfy the intentional component of the battery claim, courts merely
require that the touching was voluntary and the defendant intended to make
H,ntaHt ZitC s,.e,ne’s *ers,n. TCis Bust .eans tCat tCe aHt,r’s .,'e.ent
cannot be the result of an automatic reflex, such as a knee-jerk reaction, epileptic
seizure, or coercion.130 There is no required intent to injure or offend, and there
is n, need t, *r,'e tCat tCe aHt,r Zas Dins*ired bW anW *ers,nal C,stilitW.3131
Indeed, even a friendly practical joke can lead to a battery claim.132While courts
continue to bungle this standard, it remains the black letter common law,
123. Richard J. Kohlman, Assault and Battery, 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 613 (3d ed. 2017).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
125. Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872); Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
126. Seigel v. Long, 53 So. 753 (1910).
127. Koffman v. Garnett, 574 S.E.2d 258 (2003).
128. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)
129. Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
132. Id. § 19; see also id. § 20 (1965); Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines, 439 F.3d 1197, 1209
(Cal. 2006).
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endorsed by the Restatement of Torts, that defendants need not intend to cause a
harmful touching.133 They need merely intend to touch the plaintiff, in a way that
turns out to be harmful or offensive.134
3. Plaintiffs Must Prove the Touching Was Objectively Offensive
To be objectively offensive, the touching must offend a community standard
of what is considered appropriate. It is not enough that the individual herself be
subjectively offended. Thus, a hug might not be objectively offensive, so long as
it was not accompanied by other inappropriate language or intimidation.
T,uHCing s,.e,ne’s sC,ulder in a crowded subway would likely also fail to be
objectively offensive. The context matters greatly, and courts factor in the
Dusages ,f a deHent s,HietWS3 D*,lite .annersS3 and t,uHCing tCat is DHust,.arW
. . . in tCe H,urse ,f life.3135 The factfinder should consider any power imbalance,
exploitation, or subordination in determining whether the touching is offensive.
There is nothing customary or polite about allowing a stranger to touch your
body, assess your medical situation, and offer personal reproductive adviceFall
under false pretenses. No one could say that it is unreasonable to be offended by
such things. When we agree to the most intimate form of examination, and the
most intimate form of counseling, it is not unreasonable to only do so when we
think the person touching us is a licensed medical provider. A reasonable jury
could easily find the touching by CPC staff offensive, even if a few pregnant
women testified for the defense that they were not personally offended by
fraudulent touching at the pseudo-clinics.136 Just as it does not matter whether
,ne *ers,n .igCt n,t find an unin'ited AissS ,r bl,Zing s.,Ae in ,ne’s faHeS
offensive, it does not matter whether a minority of women find the touching
unobjectionable. The question for the courts is whether it is objectively
reasonable for this plaintiff to be offended by the violation of her personal
dignity, once she realizes the real motivation of the CPC.
It is hard to imagine a touching that could be more offensiveFasking a
woman to expose her belly or submit to a vaginal exam, revealing private
information about a pregnancy or a fetus that is growing inside of her (and
possibly information about miscarriage or anatomical defects). If the woman
agrees to this, it is almost always because she considers this to be a clinical
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
134. DTCe faHt tCat tCe Wagners allege that Mr. Giese could not have intended to harm her, or
understood that his attack would inflict injury or offense, is not relevant to the analysis of whether a battery
occurred. So long as he intended to make that contact, and so long as that contact was one to which Mrs.
Wagner had not given her consent, either expressly or by implication, he committed a battery.3 /agner
'. 1taC _e*’t ,f Nu.an Ser's.S @?? 6.>d <88S ;@Q U1taC ?QQ<T.
135. Id. at ;Q8 UD\P[,r eXa.*leS s,.e,ne ZC, sCaAes Cis Cand against Cis silent ZisCes Cas n,t
H,..itted a Car.ful ,r ,ffensi'e H,ntaHt.3T.
136. Glover v. Oppleman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 622, 641 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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encounter, and not an ideological one. If tCe !6!’s deHe*ti'e t,uHCing is n,t a
'i,lati,n ,f ,ne’s dignitW and rigCt t, H,ntr,l ZC, gets t, t,uHC ,neselfS tCen it
is hard to see what would be. The only way a judge could find that this sort of
unconsented-to touching was not a battery would be by misapplying the common
law of civil battery for political ends. Indeed, the CPCs must know that women
would not otherwise consent to such touching, or they would not work so hard,
and fight all the way up to the Supreme Court, to deceive women in their
advertising practices. Why do the CPCs try to take control of the conversation
and mislead women about the nature of their services? Because they know that
without the misleading tactics, they would not be granted access to pregnant
Z,.en’s b,dies.
4. Misrepresentations Vitiate Consent
In some states, the plaintiff needs to prove that the touching was not
consented to, while in other states this is an affirmative defense the defendant
must raise. Either way, if it is shown that the plaintiff reasonably misunderstood
the purpose of the touching, due to misrepresentations by the defendant, then
consenting to the medical exam or procedure will not bar her claim. Courts have
long recognized that a plaintiff might have technically consented to a blood draw,
for example, but thought the blood draw was for medical purposes. If the blood
draw were instead for law enforcement purposes, the consent is invalid.137
TCe DHruX ,f a batterW Hlai. is an absenHe ,f H,nsent on the part of the
*laintiff.3138 Consent is contextual. A famous Torts treatise even uses a medical
eXa.*le t, .aAe tCis *,int. It states: tCe D*laintiff ZC, H,nsents t, .ani*ulati,n
of her body in the belief that it is for medical purposes, when in fact it is only for
tCe seXual gratifiHati,n ,f tCe defendantS3 Han Ca'e a Hause ,f aHti,n f,r
battery.139 ^,u H,uld substitute DseXual gratifiHati,n3 f,r Datte.*ting t, d,
O,d’s Z,rA3 and tCe sa.e *re.ise C,lds. TCe aHti,n f,r batterW reH,gniVes tCat
the individual has a right to exclude others from touching her and to control the
way they do so. Full stop.
There are four different types of consent applicable to our facts, and
satisfying the criteria for any of them would preclude liability: actual consent;
apparent or implied consent; constructive consent; and the emergency
doctrine.140 However, none of these categories of consent apply to preclude
liability for the CPCs. First, there is no actual (express or implied) consent in the
137. 7’"rien '. SWnn,ttS :? #.>d >>@S >><-36 (Vt. 2013).
138. Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Md. 1997).
139. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (2d ed. 2018).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 111 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
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case where a pregnant woman is never explicitly told that the medically
costumed volunteer is in fact unlicensed.141
JiAeZiseS tCe !6! Hann,t relW ,n Dreas,nablW a**arent H,nsentS3 ,r i.*lied
consent.142/Cile a *atient .igCt H,nsent t, D,rdinarW *CWsiHal H,ntaHts tCat are
medically necessarW3 ZCen sCe 'isits Cer d,Ht,r f,r Cer annual *CWsiHalS H,nsent
to the CPC cannot be inferred from the facts. In the oft-cited case of O’Brien v.
Cunard S.S. Co.,143 the evidence that plaintiff held out her arm to be vaccinated,
in a line of people exiting a ship, demonstrated not only that the defendant
reasonably believed that she consented, but also that she did consent. This sort
of implied consent is not present here; the pregnant woman is not implicitly
consenting to a medical exam by the CPC. She is consenting to an exam by a
different person and in a different context.
While a defendant would not be liable for battery if a reasonable person in
the position of the actor believes that the would-be plaintiff consented to the
aHt,r’s ,tCerZise t,rti,us H,nduct,144 it would be unreasonable for a CPC staff
member to believe that the pregnant woman had truly consented, given the
!6!’s ide,l,giHal agenda. #s .enti,ned above,145 CPC staff are trained in
applying deceptive practices to persuade women to carry the fetus to term. CPCs
take advantage of these Z,.en’s relati'e laHA ,f eduHati,nS .,neWS and
insurance to deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical, as opposed
to ideological, care. Given their deceptive playbook, and the fact that they do not
tell pregnant women who appear at their clinics that they are unlicensed medical
providers who do not provide the full range of reproductive services, consent to
the touching cannot be inferred or apparent from the facts. Indeed, given how
CPCs deliberately locate very near Planned Parenthoods and adopt clinically-
sounding names, the very reasonable and clear intention of CPCs is to gain
aHHess t, Z,.en’s b,dies tCr,ugC deHeption, not informed consent.
PurtCerS as disHussed ab,'e under tCe D,bBeHti'elW ,ffensi'e3 ele.ent ,f
battery, there is no constructive consent either. Several courts have recognized
tCat Din a Hr,Zded Z,rldS a Hertain a.,unt ,f *ers,nal H,ntaHt is ine'itable, and
must be accepted. Absent expression to the contrary, consent is assumed to all
those ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the
141. DEX*ress consent may be given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent may be
manifested when a person takes no action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to
occur. The consent .ust be t, tCe 2defendant’s H,nduHtS ratCer tCan t, its H,nse)uenHes.’ A
*laintiff’s consent is n,t effeHti'e if DtCe consenting person was mistaken about the nature and quality of
tCe in'asi,n intended bW tCe H,nduHt.3 Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir. 1998).
142. DIf Z,rds ,r H,nduHt are reas,nablW underst,,d bW an,tCer t, be regarded as H,nsentS they
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact...In determining whether conduct would
be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the customs of the community are to be taken
int, aHH,unt.3 Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003).
143. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 115 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
145. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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H,..,n interH,urse ,f life.3146 Examples of this include touching someone
while hastily exiting a building during a fire alarm or brushing up against
someone on a crowded bus. In those circumstances, there is something like a
s,Hial neHessitW argu.entS as aff,rdable *ubliH trans*,rtati,n re)uires D.in,r
H,ntaHt betZeen *assengers.3147 Commuters are thought to consent to this
touching, as they are aware of the crowded nature of most public transit and
nonetheless agree to this mode of transportation. But there is no such social
consent in the present case. Pregnant women are not agreeing to a certain amount
of battery in order to take advantage of a public good.
Finally, emergency consent is not applicable. The emergency consent
d,Htrine DrefleHts a narr,Z set ,f HirHu.stanHes in ZCiHC tCe aHt,r reas,nablW
believes that plaintiff would have consented, if he or she had the opportunity to
do so, and in which it is imperative not to wait to see whether plaintiff really
d,es H,nsent.3148 In the kinds of cases contemplated here, there is plenty of time
t, ,btain tCe *regnant Z,.an’s H,nsent. Pailure t, d, s, is not because there is
an urgent, life-threatening clinical need that prevents asking the woman. The
only reason the consent is not explicit is because the CPCs appreciate that they
Zill l,se aHHess t, Z,.en’s b,dies if tCeW are trans*arent ab,ut tCeir ide,logical
purpose.
Thus, CPCs cannot avail themselves of any of the relevant types of consent
to preclude their liability. CPCs that misled a woman into thinking that the
purpose of the exam was to diagnose a pregnancy, or to offer medical counseling
or advice, when the real purpose is to counsel the woman on pro-life, Christian
ideology, would most certainly be liable in battery. To reiterate, where the
consent to a procedure or touching is premised on fraud or misrepresentations,
there is no valid consent.149
5 Battery Claims Do Not Balance the Rights to Batter Against the Right
Not to Be Battered
Contrary to the First Amendment analysis in NIFLA or the structure of
consumer protection or even medical malpractice laws, which might give too
.uHC deferenHe t, tCe defendant’s 'ieZ*,ints ,r *ur*,seS CereS tCe reas,ns why
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 117 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
147. Id. TCe 4estate.ent addsS DMin,r H,ntaHt betZeen passengers is reasonably necessary to
aHCie'e tCat \aff,rdable and effiHient *ubliH transit[ s,Hial 'alue.3 Id.
148. Id. § 118.
149. DTCe *laintiff’s *ur*,rted H,nsent is ineffeHti'e t, bar Cer Hlai. if it is induHed bW
misrepresentation or is given under a material mistake of which the defendant is or should be aware. The
mistake is frequently though not always induced by the defendant’s fraud ,r .isre*resentati,n. ManW
Hases deHided in .anW settings su..ariVe tCe *,int bW saWing tCat 2fraud 'itiates H,nsent’ ,r tCat H,nsent
is ineffeHti'e if gi'en as a result ,f fraudS .eaning tCat tCe *laintiff in suHC a Hase Han reH,'er.3 DOBBS
ET AL., supra note 139.
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the defendant battered the plaintiff are largely irrelevant.150 When the touching
is not consented to, courts do not balance the interests of the batterer against the
interests of the battered. The battery cause of action is about protecting the
inviolate dignity of the individual person. In keeping with this, battery is not a
paternalistic or ideological doctrine. The defendant cannot argue that they failed
to disclose a material fact about the procedure in order to avoid any
psychological harm to the plaintiff.151 Where the First Amendment may be
interpreted in a way that protects misleading practices by CPCs, battery does not
spare defendants who deliberately mislead.
D. The Relationship Between Battery and Informed Consent
In recent years, many states have passed special informed consent laws that
are exclusive to the abortion context. These Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Provider (TRAP) laws require abortion providers to say specific things to
pregnant women as part of the informed consent process. Given that informed
consent as a legal and ethical doctrine developed from the tort of battery, it will
be useful to discuss how this occurred, in order to understand how these TRAP
laws pervert the very notion of informed consent.
Historically, informed consent suits began as intentional torts for
unconsented-to touching by physicians, even where the care received was not
negligent. One of the first cases to recognize the trespass to persons against a
surgeon who operated on someone without her consent was Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital.152 In this 1914 case, the plaintiff claimed that the
hospital staff removed her stomach tumor while she was under anesthesia,
despite her explicit requests that they not do so.153 In deciding that the hospital
could be liable for a battery, if not for negligence, Judge Cardozo famously stated
that D\e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
ZitC,ut Cis *atient’s H,nsentS H,..its an assaultS f,r ZCiHC Ce is liable in
da.ages.3154 A 1913 Oklahoma case further recognized that the skillful removal
,f a *atient’s b,ne H,uld H,nstitute a batterWS ZCere tCe *atient Cad n,t H,nsented
150. D\M[anW t,rts tCat are Hlassified as intenti,nal differ fr,. t,rts ,f negligenHe n,t s, .uHC
because they represent a more serious degree of fault, but because they exhibit a type of fault not
a**r,*riatelW g,'erned bW tCe 2reas,nable Hare’ *aradig.: TCeW f,Hus ,n *r,teHti,n ,f HarefullW defined
interests (such as freedom from confinement, and choice about medical treatment or other physical
t,uHCingsTS ZCile tCeW li.it legal *r,teHti,n t, tCe .,st deliberate Ainds ,f intrusi,ns ,n tCese interests.3
Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1100 (2006).
151. Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
152. SHCl,end,rff '. S,H’W ,f IeZ ^,rA N,s*.S @Q< I.E. 8?S 8> UI.^. @8@=TS abrogated by Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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to its removal.155 Thus, even where there is not negligence, there can be a medical
battery.
In the medical context, the intentional tort has morphed into a negligence
cause of action in all but a few states.156 This is because enough of a norm has
developed through medical ethics and practice to say that the failure to provide
relevant medical information to a patient, about the purpose and risks of their
treatment, is now a breach of the professional standard of care. The American
MediHal #ss,Hiati,n Cas issued an etCiHs ,*ini,nS ZCiHC states tCat Dinf,r.ed
H,nsent t, .ediHal treat.ent is funda.ental in b,tC etCiHs and laZ.3157 For
medical professionals, what started as a battery is now considered medical
malpractice. Where CPC facilities and staff are licensed as medical providers in
their states, then, pregnant women should sue them for ordinary negligence and
medical malpractice. Because it is recognized that medical providers should
inform women of the purpose of their care, as well as the risks and benefits of
any procedures, an informed consent claim should be easy to demonstrate.
Importantly, while the Supreme Court declared in NIFLA that CPCs are not
practicing medicine, and therefore the informed consent requirements of Casey
did not apply, it is up to the states, and not federal courts, to determine whether
entities are practicing medicine and subjected to professional malpractice claims
under state law.158
Canterbury v. Spence, one of the early cases to describe the tort of informed
H,nsentS stated tCat D\t[rue H,nsent t, ZCat Ca**ens t, ,ne’s self is tCe informed
exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably
the options available and the risks attendant upon each.3159 Today, making out a
case for informed consent requires proving that the defendant breached a
standard of care in terms of what reasonable physicians would share with a
patient, or what prudent patients would find material to their decision to elect or
155. Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913).
156. D7ften inf,r.ed H,nsent Hlai.s blur int, .al*raHtiHe Hlai.s.3 JANET DOLGIN & LOIS
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 59 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2009). See Bryan J. Warren,
Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning
the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917, 918 (2000); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md.
1977). But see 6ereV '. NuS 9: I.E.>d @@>QS @@>< UInd. !t. #**. ?Q@:T UDJaHA ,f inf,r.ed H,nsent is
viewed as a battery claim if there is an alleged complete lack of consent to medical treatment, but
,tCerZise it is 2regarded as a s*eHifiH f,r. ,f negligenHe f,r breaHC ,f tCe re)uired standard ,f
*r,fessi,nal H,nduHt.’3T; Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 507 A.2d 718 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986).
157. Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/6ARD-Z9WT] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
158. The joint opinion in Casey explained that the law regulated s*eeHC ,nlW 2as *art ,f tCe practice
,f .ediHineS subBeHt t, reas,nable liHensing and regulati,n bW tCe State.’3 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
(emphasis added). Indeed, the requirement that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an operation
is Dfir.lW entrenHCed in #.eriHan t,rt laZ.3 Cruzan v. _ir.S M,. _e*’t ,f NealtC, 497 U. S. 261, 269
(1990). See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (explaining that
2a surge,n ZC, *erf,r.s an ,*erati,n ZitC,ut Cis *atient’s H,nsent H,..its an assault.’3T.
159. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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forego treatment.160 The former standard asks what information a reasonable
physician would provide, and reflects the idea that physicians cannot read
*atients’ .inds t, An,Z ZCat eaHC Zould subjectively want to know. The latter
D*rudent *atient3 standard is a**lied in a sligCt .in,ritW ,f statesS and f,Huses
,n tCe DrisAsS benefitsS and ,*ti,ns tCat a reas,nable *atient Z,uld Zant t, An,Z
in reaHCing a treat.ent deHisi,n.3161 It is rooted in patient autonomy, and
recognizes that while the physician may have expertise in clinical decision-
making, she is not an expert in what reasonable patients would want to have
disclosed.
1. TRAP Laws Pervert the Doctrine of Informed Consent
Ironically, an article about abortion access could not address battery and
informed consent without recognizing the absurd turns the doctrine has taken
under states’ T4#6 laZs. TRAP laws are
part of anti-ab,rti,n aHti'ists’ strategW t, HCi* aZaW at tCe legal a'ailability
of abortion . . . by heavily regulating the practice of providing abortions.
These laws are examples of abortion exceptionalism, in which abortion is
singled out for more restrictive government regulation as compared to other,
similar procedures.162
Legislators often justify these TRAP laws as being necessary for true informed
consent, and many TRAP laws are placed in sections of the state code that apply
to medical informed consent generally. A majority of states have such laws,
which place requirements ,n ab,rti,n *r,'iders DtCat are .,re de.anding tCan
f,r anW ,tCer .ediHal *r,Hedure.3163 Occasionally, these TRAP laws pervert the
legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent.
P,r eXa.*leS under tCe guise ,f Dinf,r.ed H,nsentS3 .anW states re)uire
physicians to provide specific, and sometimes misleading, information to
women. An analysis of the mandatory pre-abortion informed consent materials
in 23 states revealed that 45 percent of the statements about first trimester fetal
development were medically inaccurate.164 Examples of inaccuracies included
160. DIn sligCtlW ,'er Calf tCe statesS tCe legal standard f,r disHl,sure t, *atients is tCat ZCiHC a
2reasonable medical practitioner’ would provide. This professionally defined standard is often that of the
locality in which the practitioner works, or a similar locality. The disclosure standard in most other
jurisdictions is that which would be sought by a prudent or reasonable patient, a standard that emphasizes
tCe 'alue ,f *atient aut,n,.W ,'er tCat ,f *r,fessi,nal Budg.ent.3 6eter N. SHCuHAS Rethinking Informed
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994).
161. DOLGIN, supra note 156, at 49-50.
162. Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER&L. 1, 2-3 (2012).
163. Id. at 13.
164. Cynthia Daniels, et al., Informed or Misinformed Consent, Abortion Policy in the United
States, 41 J. OFHEALTH POL., POL’Y&L. 181, 193 (2016).
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state.ents suHC as Dbrain aHti'itW Han be reH,rded3 at f,ur-ZeeAs’ gestati,nS ,r
,tCer state.ents tCat re*,rted DbabW-liAe3 beCa'i,rs bef,re tCeW H,uld be
seen.165
In addition to misinformation related to the development of the fetus,
Miss,uri re)uires tCat tCe *CWsiHian inf,r. tCe *regnant Z,.an tCat D\t[Ce life
of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a
se*arateS uni)ueS li'ing Cu.an being.3166 Of course this blurs objective clinical
information with religious ideology. It is ethically unsound to ask physicians to
deliver propaganda for conservative legislators, shrouded in the veil of
professional judgment. In any event, this uses the legitimate and professional
voices of physicians as shoehorns for ideology, by erroneously treating it like
other forms of medical informed consent.
In TeXasS Z,.en .ust be inH,rreHtlW t,ld tCat Ca'ing an ab,rti,n D.aW
make it difficult or impossible to become pregnant in the future or carry a
*regnanHW t, ter..3167 In South Dakota, women are given information that
abortion increases the risk of infertility, without making it clear that only a highly
unlikely complication will increase this risk.168 Indiana provides some caveats,
but the informed consent materials nonetheless leave the reader with the
impression that abortion carries with it an increased risk of infertility and
complications with future pregnancies. 169 Of course, this depends greatly on the
gestational age of the fetus. Unqualified statements about abortion causing
infertility are medically inaccurate, and yet physicians are required to share this
false data in at least four states.170 In Indiana, pregnant women must be told that
the fetus must be either buried in an DestablisCed He.eterW3 ,r DHre.ated3 bW tCe
abortion clinic.171
In thirteen states, women must be instructed on the ability of a fetus to feel
pain.172 In Utah, physicians must share with pregnant women the puzzling
state.ent tCat Dsubstantial .ediHal e'idenHe3 Cas sC,Zn tCat tCe Dfetus is
Ha*able ,f feeling *ainS3 and tCus anestCesia .ust be *r,'ided if tCe ab,rti,n is
165. Id. at 191, 195.
166. MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERVICES, MO. INFORMED CONSENT BOOKLET, http://
health.mo.gov/living/families/womenshealth/pregnancyassistance/pdf/InformedConsentBooklet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7XW-YBZ8].
167. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 17 (2003), http://www.dshs.state.tx.
us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHP-YAMG].
168. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2017).
169. IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT BROCHURE 6,
https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Abortion_Informed_Consent_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZT3-VSV
B].
170. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Oct. 2018, https://
www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [https://perma.cc/G
K7T-BRDG].
171. IND. STATEDEP’T OFHEALTH, supra note 169, at 11.
172. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 170. For a constitutional analysis, see I. Glenn Cohen
& Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 235
(2011).
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performed after 20 ZeeAs’ gestati,n.173 First, there is no substantial evidence of
this,174 and second, providing anesthesia would impose a significant risk on the
pregnant woman and the fetus that may not be clinically justified. Requiring
anesthesia after 20 weeks, for every pregnancy, violates norms of professional
ethics, as the physician should not do harm to the patient that is not balanced by
some corresponding benefit.175
TCe *resenHe ,f tCese Dfetal *ain3 laZs is e'en.,re H,nf,unding gi'en tCat
full-term, natural childbirth can be very painful for the baby. Objectively, this is
a stressful event. Their 40 week skulls are compressed, their heart rate increases,
and their bodies are mangledFbut there is no requirement that a vaginal delivery
be preceded by anesthesia in Utah or elsewhere. The discrepancy between the
requirement that physicians administer anesthesia during abortions at 20 weeks,
but not at full-term vaginal deliveries, reveals the true purpose behind these
lawsFt, disH,urage Z,.en’s re*r,duHti'e HC,iHes. 4e)uiring a d,Ht,r t,
deliver this message again blurs the line between the clinical and the ideological.
This is quite dangerous in a society predicated on secular delivery of health care
and freedom of religious exercise. Indeed, the informed consent laws of Missouri
are presently being challenged by a religious group that claims that in their view,
human life does not begin at conception, and the informed consent materials
violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christian ideology.176
173. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-308.5 (Deering ?Q@9T UD. . . \s[ubstantial .ediHal
evidence from studies concludes that an unborn child who is at least 20 weeks gestational age may be
capable of experiencing pain during an abortion procedure . . . and the *CWsiHian DsCall ad.inister an
anesthetic or analgesic to eliminate or alleviate organic pain to the unborn child caused by the particular
.etC,d ,f ab,rti,n t, be e.*l,Wed.3T.
174. Madeleine Verriotis et al., The Development of the Nociceptive Brain, 338 NEUROSCIENCE
?Q:S ?Q9 U?Q@;T UDN,Z and ZCen tCis H,.*leX brain netZ,rA de'el,*s t, enH,de n,Xi,us sti.uli and
Hreate tCe eX*erienHe ,f *ain is an i.*,rtant area ,f Hurrent researHC.3T. See also Curtis Lowery et al.,
Neurodevelopmental Changes of Fetal Pain, 410 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY ?:<S ?:< U?QQ8T UDMature
thalamocortical projections are not present until 29 to 30 weeks, which has led many to believe the fetus
d,es n,t eX*erienHe e.,ti,nal 2*ain’ until tCen. 6ain re)uires b,tC n,HiHe*ti,n and e.,ti,nal reaHti,n ,r
inter*retati,n.3T.
175. See Andrea Smardon, Abortion Providers in Utah Adapt to New Anesthesia Requirement,
NPR, April 7, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473416741/abortion-providers-in-utah-adapt-to-
new-anesthesia-requirement [https://perma.cc/5422-EC6M]. Medical ethics requires respect for
aut,n,.W and benefiHenHe t,Zard *atients. TCese are DtZ, ,f tCe funda.ental *rinHi*les3 tCat g,'ern
patient interactions. Beneficence requires physicians to promote good and act in the best interest of the
patient’s CealtC. TCusS *CWsiHians sC,uld n,t d, tCings tCat Car. *atientsS ZitC 'erW little benefit. See
Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for
Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2010).
176. Doe v. Greitens, 530 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). See also Linley Sanders, Abortion
Rights Fight Has an Unlikely Champion: The Satanic Temple, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/satanic-temple-pushes-abortion-fight-missouri-supreme-court-679779
[https://perma.cc/Y2CU-8X6E].
2018] Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics 259
2. TRAP Laws Ignore Casey’s Dicta on Informed Consent
The 1992 Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey made it clear that states can require physicians to inform
women seeking abortion about the physiological development of the fetus or the
risks of the abortion procedure.177 However, this was conditioned on the
information being truthful and non-misleading,178 and allowing the physician to
use her judgment to customize the information to the particular patient.179 The
Casey Court made their reasoning explicit: it was not to add extraordinary
informed consent in the abortion arena, but to place informed consent on equal
footing with other areas of medicine. The message was that informed consent in
ab,rti,n sC,uld be Dn, different3 and tCe d,Ht,r-*atient relati,n Zas Dentitled t,
tCe sa.e s,liHitude it reHei'es in ,tCer H,nteXts.3180 Further, in recognizing that
previous abortion informed consent laws had been struck down, the Court
distinguished those in Casey bW stating tCat 6ennsWl'ania’s laZs Zere n,t
Ddesigned t, dissuade tCe Z,.an fr,. Ca'ing an ab,rti,n3 and did n,t Di.*,se
a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irres*eHti'e ,f tCe *artiHular needs ,f tCe *atient.3181 In NIFLA, the Court
narrowed the holding of Casey so that it only applied to licensed medical
providers immediately before providing an abortion procedure.
Legislators who have passed TRAP laws that require physicians to provide
medically inaccurate or misleading information have ignored this important dicta
from Casey.182 The part of Casey getting more attention is the general
requirement that a TRAP law not *laHe an Dundue burden3 ,n tCe eXerHise ,f tCe
Z,.an’s rigCt. Casey’s undue burden test C,lds tCat Da *r,'isi,n ,f laZ is
invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a
Z,.an seeAing an ab,rti,n.3183 The Circuits were somewhat split in terms of
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
178. Id.
179. D!ritiHal t, ,ur deHisi,ns in Akron and Thornburgh to invalidate a governmental intrusion
into the patient-doctor dialogue was the fact that the laws in both cases required all doctors within their
respective jurisdictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplating an abortion a litany of information,
regardless of whether the patient sought the information or whether the doctor thought the information
neHessarW t, tCe *atient’s deHisi,n.3 4ust '. Sulli'anS <QQ 1.S. @:>S ?Q> U@88@T.
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
181. Id. at 882.
182. Indeed, following /C,le /,.en’s NealtC '. Hellerstedt, these types of TRAP laws will be
under greater scrutiny. Given that Whole Women’s Health stated that courts can look to common sense
and tCe aHtual effeHts ,f T4#6 laZs ,n a Z,.an’s H,nstituti,nal rigCtsS as ,**,sed t, s*eHulating ab,ut
whether tCe state’s interests are narr,ZlW tail,redS it Zill be HruHial t, H,lleHt data ,n C,Z T4#6 laZs
unduly burden the right to terminate. See Whole Women’s NealtC '. NellerstedtS @>; S. !t. ??8?S ?>@:
U?Q@;T UD!,urts are free t, base tCeir findings ,n H,..,nsense inferenHes draZn fr,. tCe e'idenHe.3T.
183. CaseyS <Q< 1.S. at 9:9. N,Ze'erS as M,Cn 4,berts,n Cas *,inted ,utS Dfinding an i.*r,*er
purpose to stop abortion or burden women will be rare, given the legitimate fetal-protection, health, and
autonomy H,nHerns tCat.igCt.,ti'ate legislat,rs . . . .3 M,Cn#. 4,berts,nS Science Disputes in Abortion
Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2015). Instead, as the Supreme Court recognized in Whole Women’s
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how to interpret this language and how much deference to give to empirical
evidence to demonstrate an undue burden. However, the Supreme Court in
Whole Women’s Health ,ffered guidanHeS stating tCat D\H[,urts are free to base
tCeir findings ,n H,..,nsense inferenHes draZn fr,. tCe e'idenHe.3184
Regardless of how future courts interpret this important test, however, legislators
have deliberately ignored it, and Casey’s dicta on informed consent, when
fashioning pro-life TRAP laws.185 This is perhaps because they were setting up
legal challenges to Casey itself, anticipating the replacement of Justice Kennedy
on the Supreme Court.186
Informed consent is not some slippery placeholder that means whatever you
want it to mean. It has a history and specific content. Informed consent means
that accurate, relevant information will be shared with a competent patient, who
will have adequate time to process it, understand it, and then use this information
to make a voluntary medical decision.187 According to the American Medical
#ss,Hiati,n’s 7*ini,n ,n tCis .atterS D\s[uHHessful H,..uniHati,n in tCe
patient-physician relationship fosters trust and supports shared decision
.aAingS3 and tCus *CWsiHians .ust D\*[resent rele'ant inf,r.ation accurately
and sensiti'elWS in Aee*ing ZitC tCe *atient’s *referenHes f,r reHei'ing .ediHal
information.3188 TCe *regnant Z,.an’s deHisi,n Han be neitCer ',luntarW n,r
informed if it is based on misrepresentations. But this is precisely what many
TRAP laws, and deceptive CPCs, do.
#s MuditC _aar H,rreHtlW *,ints ,utS tCe Dinf,r.ed H,nsent3 T4#6 laZs blur
ethical clinical judgment with legislative ideology. According to Professor Daar,
inf,r.ed H,nsent is n,t Zell su**,rted ZCen T4#6 laZs Dfoist a scripted
.essage dis*laWing tCe state’s .,ral re*ugnanHe t, tCe *r,*,sed treat.ent
Health, the second prong of the undue burden test may be met with empirical, common sense data on the
aHtual effeHt tCese laZs Ca'e ,n Z,.en’s aHHess t, ab,rti,n.
184. Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2317.
185. For a recent example, see the 2018 proposed bill in the Utah state legislature making abortion
illegal at any point in the pregnancy, if the purpose is to terminate a fetus with Trisomy 21. The legislators
Zere ad'ised bW tCe state’s legislati'e ad'is,rW H,..ittee tCat tCis bill Z,uld 'i,late Casey, but the
sponsors pursued it nonetheless. See Luke Ramseth, Here’s What You Need to Know About Utah’s
Proposed Down Syndrome Abortion Ban, Salt Lake Trib. (March 4, 2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/health/2018/03/04/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-utahs-proposed-
down-syndrome-abortion-ban/ [https://perma.cc/KSN2-G89G].
186. While not the focus of this article, the replacement of Justice Kennedy with Justice
Kavanaugh, nominated by President Trump, is likely to move the Supreme Court in a significantly more
conservative direction as it relates to reproductive rights. Justice Kennedy had three times affirmed the
basic holding of Roe v. WadeFby signing on to the majority of Casey; by assuming it was controlling in
the Carhart opinion that he wrote; and in signing on to the opinion in Whole Women’s Health. For a brief
summary of MustiHe Ka'anaugC’s *,siti,n ,n re*r,duHti'e rigCtsS and 4,e '. /adeS see !lare P,ran +
Joan Biskupic, Where Brett Kavanaugh Stands on Key Issues, CNN (Oct. 6, 2018), https:
//www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/kavanaugh-on-the-issues/index.html [https://perma.cc/LDC5-UDK
4]; see also Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Gave Us Its First View of How It Will Handle Abortion
in the Kavanaugh Era, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 10, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/supreme-court-
abortion-kavanaugh-05ac30d8b22a/ [https://perma.cc/UKZ4-KGJD].
187. See generally Schuck, supra note 159, at 902-05.
188. Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, supra note 157.
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*lan.3189 Scholars in medical ethics have generally agreed that this requires
*CWsiHians t, DH,..it an untenable etCiHal and *r,fessi,nal Zr,ngFdeceiving
their patients by providing false information and withholding empirically
derived, evidence-based HliniHal data.3190 Even so, as Jessie Hill points out,
DH,urts tend t, be CigClW *er.issi'e3 ,f T4#6 laZsS ZCile DtCeW Ca'e ,ften been
more skeptical of disclosure requirements imposed on [C6!s[.3191 It is this
federal First Amendment jurisprudence protecting CPC deception that begs for
a private, state tort remedy.
E. The Practical Advantages of Battery Over Negligence Claims
Battery places tCe 'iHti. ,f tCe Car. in tCe dri'er’s seatS all,Zing her to
decide whom to sue and for how much. Battery also entitles the plaintiff to
potential punitive damages, in addition to any damages for her pain and suffering
or dignitary harm.192While punitive damages are rare, they are more likely to be
awarded in intentional tort cases where there is willful misconduct, malice, or
reckless disregard for the rights of others.193 If the jury finds that the particular
CPC defendant willfully misled the plaintiff in order to get her to carry her
pregnancy to term, then punitive damages might be warranted. This could make
tCe laZsuit.,re attraHti'e f,r *laintiffs’ att,rneWs t, taAe ,n a H,ntingenHW basisS
which might improve access to justice for low-income women.
Given that most states follow the physician-standard for informed consent,
these cases will often require expert testimony as to what the physician should
have disclosed. It can often be difficult for plaintiffs to find a physician who will
testify against another local physician in this regard. Further, even under the
patient-standard, in order to prove the causation element of negligence the
plaintiff needs to prove that, had she been adequately informed, she would have
chosen to do something different. It is often difficult to prove causation, even
where the patient could prove that some information was negligently withheld.
Will the jury believe the claim that the patient would have chosen differently?
189. Judith Daar, Distinctions in Disclosure: Mandated Informed Consent in Abortion and ART,
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 255, 256 (2015).
190. Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical
Ethics and Law Collide, 39 HASTINGS CTR REP. 21, 21 (2009).
191. Hill, supra note 2S at ;Q UDTCusS in H,ntrast t, tCe striHt sHrutinW tCat a**lies t, H,.*elled
s*eeHC in tCe H,nteXt ,f ZCat .aW be Halled 2*ubliH disH,urseS’ tCe !,urt i.*lied tCat ,nlW rati,nal basis
review is applicable to restrictions and speech requirements in the professional speech context, at least
where, as in CaseyS tCe s*eeHC is f,und t, be trutCfulS n,n.isleadingS and rele'ant t, tCe Z,.an’s
deHisi,n.3T.
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFTORTS: PHYSICAL&EMOTIONALHARM § 46 (AM. LAW. INST.
?Q@?T UDAn actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm causes
bodily har.S als, f,r tCe b,dilW Car..3T% Kohlman, supra note 123.
193. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 536-37 (4th ed. 2016).
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In these respects, a battery claim is easier to prove. The battery plaintiff need
not prove that the physician had a duty to disclose anything, that the failure was
a breach of a professional standard of care, or that she would have chosen not to
have the exam had she known its true nature.194 The battery cause of action is
much more protective of the physical integrity of the plaintiff and does not
balance this interest against the rights of the defendant. In a battery claim, there
is no deference to the community or industry practices of defendants.
Given that the petitioner in NIFLA claimed that it was not providing medical
care, a civil plaintiff could cite this when arguing that an informed consent claim
would be inappropriate for a plaintiff who is seen at an unlicensed CPC. But,
more appropriately, the problem with an informed consent claim is that the
defendant CPC is not a medical provider, and the elaborate ethical canons that
have developed for physicians do not apply to unlicensed CPCs. The CPC
plaintiff is not technically a patient, even if she thinks that she is. It is the unique
position of the physician, and the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship,
that has led to the development of informed consent as a claim. You cannot bring
an informed consent-style claim against your auto-mechanic or plumber, nor can
you bring one against a CPC. Instead, you would need to prove battery or
ordinary negligence by the defendant. Under ordinary negligence, given that the
plaintiff would be arguing that inadequate information was shared, this claim
Z,uld be fra.ed as a Dfailure t, Zarn3 tW*e ,f Hlai..
Failure to warn claims are notoriously difficult to win. This is because the
common law does not impose affirmative duties to protect or warn on just any
defendant; there must be a special relationship between the parties. Historically,
the special relationship has been one where there is a power imbalance between
the plaintiff and defendant, where the defendant is a fiduciary of the plaintiff, or
where the plaintiff puts her safety or person in the custody of the defendant. The
classiH Ds*eHial relati,nsCi*3 tCat gi'e rise t, a dutW t, Zarn are landl,rdRtenantS
doctor/patient, and business/customer relationships.
The CPC facility, in taking on a pseudo-clinical function and holdings its
doors open to the public to provide counseling services, would quite likely be
H,nsidered in a Ds*eHial relati,nsCi*3 ZitC tCe *regnant Z,.an. TCusS tCe !6!
would likely be under a duty to protect and warn the women it sees in its pseudo-
clinic, even when it is unlicensed. This could create obvious duties to provide
accurate and complete information to the woman. However, this argument would
depend on the judge and her notions of what makes for good public policy. The
judge makes decisions about whether there is a duty by looking to a long list of
factors. Given the political context in which abortion cases are decided, and the
194. See Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
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historical inability for judges to treat abortion as unexceptional in tort,195 the
negligence cause of action against CPCs is not as desirable as a battery claim.
Moreover, damages in a negligence or informed consent case might be
modest. Typically, negligence damages are awarded to pay for economic
expenses and pain and suffering that result as a consequence of the breach.
However, many states limit the amount of pain and suffering damages that can
be awarded and might limit the economic damages if they are framed as caring
for a healthy, unwanted, child. Such claims are unfortunately referred to as
DZr,ngful birtC3 Hlai.s.
If the negligence case is framed as a failure to provide adequate information
that resulted in the birth of a child, some states prohibit this type of claim
because, in their view, the birth of a child can never be an injury.196 States are
about evenly split on whether they will allow for some recovery for the cost of
raising a child when the traditional negligence elements are met.197 Some states
will only allow for compensatory damages for child-rearing expenses when the
HCild tCat is b,rn Cas se'ere disabilities. TCis .aAes DZr,ngful birtC3 Hlai.s
exceptional, when in reality calculating the damages from child care and medical
expenses are quite ordinary, but courts have struggled with the philosophical
implications of allowing the birth of a child to be an injury.198 If, instead, the
claim is brought as a battery claim, the plaintiff will dodge this philosophical
bullet. However, depending on the jurisdiction, the plaintiff may not be able to
receive damages for regular child-rearing expenses.
IV. REGULATING CPCS AS PRACTICINGMEDICINEWITHOUT A LICENSE
A. Medical Licensing Laws Protect the Public and Have Been Deemed
Constitutional
NIFLA teaches states they will need to pursue other non-pregnancy-specific
options if they want to protect their citizens from deceptive CPC practices. The
next option that will be explored is the prosecution of CPCs for the unlicensed
practice of medicine. Even the petitioners in NIFLA acknowledged this
possibility, though they seemed confident that they were not practicing medicine.
Assuming, arguendo, that NIFLA does not practice medicine under a free speech
195. Judges struggle to apply basic tort concepts about compensatory damages to wrongful birth
cases, given that the successful wrongful birth claim requires the parents to argue that they would have
had an abortion had the physician informed them of material clinical information. See generally Kassama
v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1117 (Md. 2002); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984); Turpin v.
Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982).
196. CHARLES KRAUSE, ALFRED GANS & MONIQUE LEAHY, 2A AM. L. OF TORTS §§ 9:27-28
U?Q@9T UDTCe.aB,r ,bstaHle t, an infant *laintiff’s Hlai. in suHC a Hase is tCe deter.inati,n ,f da.ages.3T.
197. Id. § 9:27.
198. Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assoc., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ohio
?QQ;T UD"irtC ,f a n,r.alS CealtCW HCild Hann,t be an inBurW t, Cer *arents.3T.
264 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 30:2
analysis, many states would likely disagree that CPCs are not practicing
.ediHine. In a bit ,f a tauntS IIPJ#’s att,rneW granted tCat D\i[t’s illegal t,
*retend t, *raHtiHe .ediHine ZitC,ut a liHenseS3 s, D\i[f tCat’s ZCat’s g,ing ,n
here, surely California would have found a way to [prosecute CPCs] before
n,Z.3199Of course, this is a different remedy, with different applicable standards
and constitutional review, but it is something California, and other states, could
and should do.
Every state prohibits the unauthorized practice of medicine, and then defines
ZCat H,nstitutes tCe D*raHtiHe ,f .ediHine3 f,r tCat state.200 New York has a
re*resentati'e laZS ZCiHC defines tCe *raHtiHe ,f .ediHine as Ddiagn,singS
treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity
,r *CWsiHal H,nditi,n.3201 In some states, like Ohio, DC,lding ,ut ,f ,ne’s self as
being engaged in the practice of medicine shall be regarded as practicing the
sa.eS3202 such that advertising or claiming to tCe *ubliH Dt, be a *raHtiti,ner ,f
.ediHine and surgerWS ,r anW ,f its branHCes3203 would be a violation. Thus,
!6!s’ diagn,stiH re*r,duHti'e ser'iHes and H,unseling Z,uld 'i,late 7Ci,’s
statute. Of course, the state licensing board and local prosecutors would have to
decide that they wanted to bring such a claim, as there is not a private right of
action. This requires the political will of elected officials. But enforcing these
statutes does not pose any First Amendment challenges. Even an extremely
conservative and anti-regulation Supreme Court would struggle to wiggle out
from established precedent that permits this kind of regulation.
In 1889, in Dent v. West Virginia,204 the Supreme Court upheld a West
Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to practice, or attempt to practice,
medicine without being qualified or a graduate of a reputable medical college.205
199. Oral Argument at 17:45, Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
200. In the mid 1970s, several state courts upheld convictions of acupuncture practitioners for the
unauthorized practice of medicine, as the insertion of needles was considered minor surgery and the use
of needles to reduce pain constituted the practice of medicine. See People v. Amber, 349 N.Y.S.2d 604
(Sup. Ct. 1973); State v. Won, 528 P.2d 594 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Wilson, 528 P.2d 279 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974). A Washington state court easily found that acupuncturists practiced medicine under the
plain language ,f tCe statuteS as tCeW D,ffer ser'iHes t, *e,*le ZitC 'ari,us affliHti,ns and tell tCe. tCeW
Han Cel* tCe. feel better.3 See State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc., 143 P.3d 618, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Chiropractors have also been prosecuted for failing to comply with state licensing regulations when their
*raHtiHe eXHeeded tCe sH,*e ,f tCeir *er.it ,r tCeW used tCe title D*CWsiHian3 ,r Dd,Ht,rS3 ZCiHC i.*lied
graduation from an allopathic, accredited medical school. See State v. Rich, 339 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ohio
1975).
201. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2018).
202. State v. Farrand, 120 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
203. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 4731.41 (West 2018).
204. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
205. William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a Physician’s Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequately
Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner Data Bank?, 14
ANNALSHEALTH L. 329, 338 (2005). See also Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation
of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALSHEALTH L. 201, 214 (1999).
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The punishment for each offense could include a $5,000 fine, or a 12-month
imprisonment in the county jail.206 The prohibition on practicing medicine
without a proper degree or license was considered by the Supreme Court to be
ZitCin tCe state’s *,Zer t, *r,teHt its HitiVens fr,. tCe DH,nse)uenHes ,f
ign,ranHe and inHa*aHitWS as Zell as ,f deHe*ti,n and fraud.3207 Medical
licensing laws have also survived most constitutional challenges, specifically
claims of unconstitutional limitation of the free exercise of religion208 and
violations of due process.209 There are limits on regulation of the medical
profession.210 However, requiring medical licensure for clinics engaged in
medical services would almost certainly be upheld. The key, of course, would be
in making the threshold determination that CPCs are practicing medicine without
a license.
The penalties imposed for violating modern regulations vary from state to
state.211 In California,212 anW *ers,n ZC, *raHtiHes DanW sWste. ,r .,de ,f
treating tCe siHA ,r affliHted3 ,r ZC, Ddiagn,sesS treatsS ,*erates f,rS ,r
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder,
inBurWS ,r ,tCer *CWsiHal ,r .ental H,nditi,n ,f anW *ers,n3 ZitC,ut a re)uired
certificate may be liable for a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for a period
of up to one year, or both. In New Hampshire,213 on the other hand, violations
may be penalized by receiving a cease and desist order or a fine of up to
$50,000.214 In Utah, practicing medicine without a license would generate a
meager civil money penalty of not more than $5,000,215 which again reflects the
weak political will of the state in enforcing these practices. Some of these fines
are modest enough that they might be easy for the CPCs to pay. Alternatively,
the state could pursue imprisonment in some states, like California, but this is
politically very unpopular and therefore quite unlikely. Given the type of
remedies involved, it is unsurprising that California has not yet chosen to
prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine. The action is not likely to
yield meaningful consumer protection where CPCs can merely pay the fine or
obtain a medical license and continue to mislead.
206. Dent, 129 U.S. at 232.
207. Id. at 122.
208. Smith v. People, 117 P. 612 (Colo. 1911).
209. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956).
210. A North Carolina law that required physicians to present pregnant women with a sonogram
of their fetus and describe the fetus in real-time, even if the woman acti'elW Da'ert\s[ Cer eWes3 and
Drefus\es[ t, CearS3 Zas f,und t, g, beW,nd tCe eXtent *er.itted f,r reas,nable regulati,n ,f tCe .ediHal
*r,fessi,nS ZCile si.ultane,uslW tCreatening Car. t, tCe *atient’s *sWHC,l,giHal CealtCS interfering ZitC
tCe *CWsiHian’s professional judgment, and compromising the doctor-patient relationship. Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242-45 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the North Carolina ultrasound law violated
the First Amendment).
211. For an overview, see 118 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 215 (2018).
212. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (Deering 2018).
213. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:24 (2018).
214. Id.
215. UTAH CODEANN. § 58-67-301 (West 2018).
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Unlicensed CPCs may run afoul of the medical licensing laws of the state,
as the diagnosis of pregnancy, the discussion of prenatal care, and the use of
ultrasound imaging will easily constitute the practice of medicine.216 While
CPCs might employ volunteer nurses and physicians, they would need to be
licensed and in good standing in each state, and the facility itself would need to
be licensed as a medical facility.
B. New York Investigates CPCs for the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine
In May of 2013, the Attorney General of New York issued a subpoena on
Evergreen Association, which operates twelve CPCs in the New York City area.
The purpose of the investigatory subpoena was to determine whether the CPCs
were engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine. A series of public
hearings conducted in 2010 and 2011 by the New York City Council found that
E'ergreen Dengaged in H,nduHt ZCiHC H,uld H,nstitute tCe unautC,riVed practice
of medicine, including evaluating fetal health and requesting the medical history
,f Hlients.3217 MeanZCileS a tele'ised neZs seg.ent re*,rted tCat DE'ergreen
made diagnoses of gestational age and situated its centers in medical buildings
.aAing tCe. a**ear liAe .ediHal ,ffiHes.3218 The subpoena was meant to
uncover whether the CPCs should be fined, as they did not appear to have any
licensed medical staff.
Evergreen attempted to quash the subpoena as a politically motivated attack
on their constitutional right to advocate against abortion. It claimed that the
Attorney General lacked a factual basis for issuing the subpoena. In June 2017,
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York found that the
#tt,rneW Oeneral Cad Da.*lW de.,nstrate\d[3 tCat a Dlegiti.ate faHtual basis
existed for the Attorney General to conduct his investigation and issue the
subpoena to determine whether Evergreen is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of medicineS3 as Ce Cad adduHed e'idenHe DtCat E'ergreen’s Henters
were set up to look like medical offices, staff members were dressed in scrubs or
lab coats, a medical history was taken from clients, diagnoses of pregnancies,
ectopic pregnancies, and gestational age were made, and medical advice was
given, including false advice.3219
The investigation could proceed, but, because Evergreen is a CPC with
ide,l,giHal r,,tsS tCe H,urt Cad t, .aAe sure tCe ,rganiVati,n’s freed,. ,f
speech and association were not unduly chilled. Therefore, the court limited the
scope of the document requests to ensure they were narrowly tailored to target
216. SeeAM. JUR. PROOFOFFACTS, supra note 211. But seeAlbini v. Connecticut Med. Examining
Bd., 72 A.3d 1208, 1214 (Conn. App. 2013) (holding that midwifery assistance for normal pregnancies
does not constitute the practice of medicine).
217. E'ergreen #ss’nS InH. '. SHCneider.anS <= I.^.S.>d @><S @>9 UI.^. App. Div. 2017).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 142.
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,nlW E'ergreen’s *r,'isi,n ,f .ediHallW-related services.220 The Attorney
General could not request documents about the overarching corporate structure
or funding of Evergreen Association, unless those individuals were related to the
provision of medical care.
The investigation by the Attorney General of New York is a step in the right
direction to protect the health of the women of NewYork. Given that many CPCs
provide confirmation of pregnancy and gestational age of the fetus and offer
prenatal vitamins, ultrasounds, and counseling on sexually transmitted
diseases,221 it is alarming that some continue to do this without having medically
licensed staff. There is great potential for substandard care and resulting harm,
as women delay seeing licensed clinicians. These are the precise kinds of risks
the state medical licensing statutes were drafted to address.
V. REGULATING CPCS BYCHALLENGING THEUSE OF FDA-APPROVED
DEVICES INUNAPPROVEDWAYS
A. The Co-Opting of the Ultrasound Device
In tCe,rWS P_# enf,rHe.ent H,uld als, *r,'ide a .eans f,r Hurbing !6!s’
deceptive practices. One of the chief ways that CPCs deceive pregnant women
is by advertising that they provide free ultrasounds. This is a major selling point,
especially for low-income women who seek their services. And given that the
biggest risk factor in failing to receive adequate prenatal care is poverty and lack
of insurance, this was precisely why California passed the FACT Act, requiring
disHl,sure ,f !alif,rnia’s state-funded pregnancy treatment options.222
Recognizing that their niche market was the underinsured, a CPC trainer advised
trainees to tell callers asking about abortion care that, while the CPC does not
offer abortion services, it does provide free ultrasounds that the woman will need
to have before she can get abortion care.223 From the pro-life perspective,
*r,'iding a guided ultras,und is DHruHial t, tCe eX*liHit tasA ,f *ersuading tCe
Z,.an n,t t, ab,rt.3224 The idea is based in part on an unproven premise that
women who abort their fetuses are doing so thoughtlessly. Once the woman sees,
220. Id. at 146.
221. Chen, supra note 5, at 936-37.
222. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS 9>8 P.>d 9?>S 9=@ U8tC !ir. ?Q@;T UDTCe
California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not be aware of, or
have access to, medical services relevant to pregnancy. This includes findings that in 2012, 2.6 million
California women were in need of publicly-funded family-planning services, and that thousands of
pregnant California women remain unaware of the state-funded programs that offer an array of services,
suHC as CealtC eduHati,n and *lanningS *renatal HareS and ab,rti,n.3T.
223. Winter, Save the Mother, Save the Baby, An Inside Look at a Pregnancy Center Conference,
COSMOPOLITAN (April 6, 2015), http://cosmopolitan.com/politics/a38642/heartbeat-international-confere
nce-crisis-pregnancy-centers-abortion [https://perma.cc/Z9HA-RCFN].
224. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 375 (2008).
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via ultrasound, the heartbeat and perhaps the head, fingers, and toes of her fetus,
she will be forced to emotionally confront the life she is about to terminate and
will change her mind.
Pro-life advocates have relied heavily on the persuasive power of the
ultrasound. Twenty-six states have enacted some form of legislation that requires
a woman to obtain an ultrasound before terminating her pregnancy. Similar bills
have been introduced in many other states.225 In Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas,
and Wisconsin, state law requires that the abortion provider show the woman the
image on the ultrasound and describe it to her, even if she does not want to see
it.226 North Carolina passed a law that required physicians performing abortions
to display and describe the image during the ultrasound, even if the woman
aHti'elW Da'ert\s[ Cer eWes3 and Drefus\es[ t, Cear.3227 TCis Dreal-ti.e 'ieZ3
aspect of the law was challenged by physicians as compelled speech that violated
their First Amendment rights (and professional ethics). The Fourth Circuit
agreed tCat tCe Dreal-ti.e 'ieZ3 *art ,f tCe statute did n,t sur'i'e inter.ediate
scrutiny.228 It Zas HritiHal t, tCe !,urt’s C,lding tCat tCe I,rtC !ar,lina laZ n,t
allow physicians to deviate from the required disclosures or timing, even if, in
the physiHian’s *r,fessi,nal Budg.entS she thought it was best to do so. Doctors
in KentuHAW are liAeZise HCallenging tCeir state’s inf,r.ed H,nsent t, ab,rti,n
statute on similar First Amendment grounds.229 It will be interesting to see what
level of scrutiny the federal courts apply, in light of NIFLA and tCe !,urt’s
dismissal of intermediate review for professional speech. Either way, state
informed-consent laws that provide for the physician to deviate from the content
of the required disclosure and timing if it is in her best medical judgment to do
so, seem much more likely to be upheld.230 Given that ultrasound is becoming a
prerequisite to obtaining an abortion, it is necessary to see what the FDA has to
say about its use in nonclinical settings, such as CPCs.
B. Ultrasounds are FDA-Approved Devices that Should Not Be Used in
Pseudo-Clinical Ways
Ultrasound is a medical technology that is regulated by the FDA. Ultrasound
provides a window into the anatomy of a fetus in utero, by sending sound waves
through soft tissue such as the pregnant belly. The sound waves bounce off the





227. 2011 N.C. SESS. LAWS 405.
228. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).
229. EM//,.en’s SurgiHal !tr.S 6.S.!. '. "esCearS ?9> P. Su**. >d ;?8S ;>? (W.D. Ky. Sept.
27, 2017).
230. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254.
2018] Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics 269
tissue and render images of the size and structure of these organs and tissues,
including any abnormalities in fetal development.231 Ultrasound has become a
very important tool in obstetrics to confirm pregnancy, diagnose ectopic and
molar pregnancies, and reveal fetal disfigurement, fetal movements, and uterine
cysts or other abnormalities.232Modern ultrasound technology employs higher
frequency sound waves that can show a moving 3-D image of the wiggling fetus.
While the technology is generally considered safe, prolonged non-clinical
exposure may have negative health effects.233 Ultrasound waves can heat the
tissues and produce small pockets of gas in body fluids or tissues.234 The long-
term consequences of these effects are still unknown.235 Out of concern for the
negative health effects on the fetus, organizations such as the American Institute
,f1ltras,und inMediHine Ca'e ad',Hated f,r D*rudent use3 ,f ultras,und during
pregnancy, and have discouraged it from being used off-label. In addition to the
biological effects of ultrasound on the pregnant woman and fetus, there are also
health risks from inadequately trained staff or poorly maintained equipment.236
Even with the 3-D advancements, ultrasound images require skill to be
interpreted correctly and meaningfully. This is especially true in early
pregnancy, when capturing the correct angles is difficult and the rendered images
may be quite ambiguous to the untrained eye. Given the skill required to capture
and interpret the images, it is shocking that many CPCs lack trained or licensed
radiological technicians. The lack of training of CPC staff can harm pregnant
women and their fetuses.
The most obvious potential harm is that women assume, incorrectly, that
their babies are healthy after having the ultrasound performed. This risk was first
identified ZCen DAee*saAe ultras,und3 studi,s suHC as Petal P,t,s ,*ened in
malls around the country. Women assumed the photographer would tell them if
they saw something abnormal in the image.237 However, some photographers
b,ldlW ann,unHed tCat DtCeW Zill ign,re fetal abn,r.alities e'en if a fetus Cas
tCree legs.3238
231. 75 AM. JUR. TRIALS 55 Ultrasound (Sonography) § 49 (2018).
232. Sanger, supra note 224, at 369.
233. See Information for Patients including Expectant Mothers, U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMIN. (Aug.
29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/
MedicalImaging/ucm115357.htm#industry [https://perma.cc/GZR4-Y2VY[ UD/Cile ultras,und is
generally considered to be safe with very low risks, the risks may increase with unnecessary prolonged
exposure to ultrasound energy, or when untrained users ,*erate tCe de'iHe.3T.
234. Avoid Fetal “Keepsake” Images, Heartbeat Monitors, U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMIN. (Dec. 16,
2016), https://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm095508.htm [https://perma.cc/FVP3-PG
BE].
235. See Information for Patients including Expectant Mothers, supra note 233.
236. Jennifer M. Uhles, Unsound Ultrasounds? An Examination of State Legislation Regulating
Non-Medical Ultrasound Use and Private Ownership, 28 J. LEGALMED. 263, 264 (2007).
237. Archie A. Alexander, “Just Scanning Around” with Diagnostic Medical Ultrasound: Should
States Regulate the Non-Diagnostic Uses of This Technology?, 16 ANNALSHEALTH L. 1, 8 (2007).
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In one instance, a woman went to a keepsake imaging studio and left
believing her baby was healthy. She later discovered at her OB/GYN clinic that
her baby had significant fetal anomalies that were consistent with Trisomy 18
and Smith-Lemli-Opitz Syndrome. These abnormalities were visible earlier, but
went undetected or unreported by the operator at the fetal keepsake studio.239
Ignoring these defects and not reporting them seems cruel, until you realize that
the photographers are probably not very experienced in reading these images and
are also trying to insulate themselves from claims of medical malpractice or the
unauthorized practice of medicine. There are many instances of clinicians being
sued for medical malpractice over improper capture or interpretation of
ultrasound images.240 Whatever line remains between keepsake studios and
clinical practice must be defended by these businesses.
If the keepsake imaging studio were held to a medical standard of care, it
could be liable for negligence for failure to report significant clinical findings.
However, given that these entities are purely commercial and make no claims
about diagnosing disorders, the consumers are poorly protected from the false
sense of security they receive. There is significant risk of psychological injury,
as well as the potential to neglect more rigorous clinical follow-up if they assume
the fetus is healthy. Unfortunately, we will probably never know the extent of
the harm done by these keepsake ultrasound studios, as they are unlikely to report
their findings to any public health agencies.241
While the practices at keepsake ultrasound studios are troubling, the risk that
the consumer will misinterpret the nature of the ultrasound is much more
profound at a pseudo-clinic, such as a CPC. If you are visiting a strip mall and
realiVe W,u are *aWing f,r a Dfun3 and Dn,'el3 ultras,und eX*erienHe in an
obviously non-clinical setting, your expectations differ significantly from the
expectations of women entering a CPC. As discussed previously, CPCs
deliberately mislead women into thinking they are seeing a nurse or doctor at a
proper health clinic. Given the heightened risk of misperception, it is much less
ethical for CPCs to employ ideological and unlicensed staff to interpret
ultrasound images.
C. States and the FDA Could Prohibit the Use of Ultrasound by Unlicensed
CPCs
Louisiana has attempted to eliminate off-label, non-clinical ultrasound
screening by defining them as an unauthorized practice of medicine under
239. Id. at 7.
240. LaRose v. Washington University, 154 S.W.3d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); see also 75 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 55 (2018).
241. Alexander, supra note 237, at 7-8.
2018] Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics 271
Louisiana law.242 California already protects somewhat against the use of
ultrasound technology for non-approved uses. In 2009, the California legislature
passed a bill that requires certain disclosures before ultrasound is used for non-
HliniHal *ur*,ses. S*eHifiHallWS tCe H,nsu.er .ust be t,ld DtCat tCe P_# Cas
determined the use of medical ultrasound equipment for reasons other than
.ediHal *ur*,ses ,r ZitC,ut a *CWsiHian’s *resHri*ti,n is an una**r,'ed use ,f
mediHal teHCn,l,gW.3243 Unfortunately, despite their ability to do so, state and
federal regulatory agencies have not enforced any actions against keepsake
ultrasound studios or CPCs based on their provision of ultrasounds.244
FDA discourages the use of ultrasound in a non-clinical setting by those who
are not trained in its use or interpretation. While off-label uses of devices may
be allowed under the supervision of a physician and within tight statutory
conditions, the use by non-clinicians such as unlicensed CPCs or keepsake
studios is clearly an unapproved off-label use.245 In addition to regulating how
the device may be used, the FDA has also deemed the promotion of unapproved
uses of a device to be a violation of FDA regulations, and the training of CPC
staff f,r an una**r,'ed use Z,uld be Dillegal *r,.,ti,nal aHti'itW.3246 FDA
could require that CPCs employ trained ultrasound technicians and comply with
clinical guidelines. Ultimately, the FDA has the authority to shut keepsake-
imaging studios down. However, given the limited resources available for
enforcement at the FDA, senior agency officials appear to have opted to focus
their attention on more high-risk devices.247
CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING INFORMED CONSENT IN THEABORTION CONTEXT
By suggesting that women bring battery causes of action against unlicensed
CPCs, this Article advocates for returning informed consent law to its ethical and
legal roots. Informed consent doctrine surrounding abortion has been perverted
by state TRAP laws, which have blurred the lines between ideology and
medicine. The majority opinion in NIFLA exacerbates this troubling trend. When
242. Under the bill as proposed, any person who administers an ultrasound upon a pregnant woman
without an order or referral shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The bill included an exception for
individuals who are licensed to practice medicine, as well as licensed advanced practice nurses and
licensed physician assistants. See Ja. State "d. ,f Med. EXa.’rsS Statement of Position, Self-Referred
Diagnostic Ultrasound Screening (Oct. 25, 2000), https://www.lsbme.la.gov/sites/default/files/doc
uments/Statements%20of%20Position/UltrasoundScreening.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H5A-HBSK] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018).
243. Uhles, supra note 236, at 270.
244. Alexander, supra note 237, at 9-10.
245. TCe all,Zed D,ff-label3 uses assu.e tCat a DCealtC Hare *raHtiti,ner3 Zill be *resHribing tCe
legallW .arAeted de'iHe Dt, a *atient3 f,r a disease ,r H,nditi,n DZitCin a legiti.ate CealtC Hare
practitioner-*atient relati,nsCi*.3 ?@ 1.S.!. & >8; U?Q@9T.
246. JAMES T.7’4EILLY ANDKATHARINEA. VAN TASSEL, 2 FOOD&DRUGADMIN. § 18:94 (4th
ed., 2018).
247. Id. § 18.1.
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physicians are required to share misinformation with their patients seeking
abortion, or when CPCs exploit the medical model, this does violence to the
sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.248 It erodes trust and sullies the
professional reputation of all physicians. Even where abortion providers follow
u* tCe .andat,rW disHl,sures ZitC disHlai.ers tCat DI ,nlW sCared tCat
information because I have to bW laZS n,t beHause I belie'e itS3 tCere is still
confusion. Does the physician speak for the government, or can she be trusted to
*r,teHt Cer *atients’ best interests$ /Cat d,es it .ean if tCe *CWsiHian is telling
the patient things that she herself does not believe? Is anything objective in
medicine, or is it all up for debate?
CPCs are exploiting the professional respect of physicians and the existing
framework of informed consent to shoehorn ideology through medicine.
Through TRAP laws and the deceptive practices of CPCs, the pro-life
community is eroding the distinction between a clinic and a pseudo-clinic, and
between politics and patient care. This could have sweeping negative impacts on
tCe *raHtiHe ,f .ediHineS and als, ,n Z,.en’s CealtC. /,.en ZC, visit CPCs
may delay being seen by actual doctors and might assume incorrectly that the
CPC staff are held to a professional standard of care. This could impose
significant health risks both on the pregnant woman and the fetus.
In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court has
recognized that states have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession.249 This should also be true in the context of abortion
providers. Recall that the Casey *luralitW stated tCat Dthe doctor-patient relation
here is entitled to the same solicitude it reHei'es in ,tCer H,nteXts.3250 This
message has sadly been lost on many state legislators, eager to pass TRAP laws
that pervert the ethical principles of patient autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice. Physicians should be allowed to have political voices.
So, too, should pro-life activists. But each should have their policy debates, and
win or lose them, in the political sphere. The sacred relationship between the
physician and patient should not be leveraged for ideological gains.
#t *resentS tCe laZ is l,*sided. TCe Pirst #.end.ent *r,teHts tCe !6!s’
deceptive practices not in spite of but because they are pseudo-clinics, motivated
not by commercial or professional interest but by ideology. Indeed, an auto-
mechanic or plumber, and certainly a licensed health care facility, is legally
prohibited from deceiving customers in the way that the CPCs do. And yet
248. DTCe relati,nsCi* betZeen a patient and physician is based on trust, which gives rise
to physicians’ etCiHal res*,nsibilitW t, *laHe patients’ Zelfare above the *CWsiHian’s own self-interest or
,bligati,ns t, ,tCersS t, use s,und .ediHal Budg.ents ,n *atients’ beCalfS and t, ad',Hate f,r tCeir
*atients’ Zelfare.3 See Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/patient-physician-relationships [https://perma.cc/2XDC-8ATB] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
249. SeeWashington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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precisely because the clinic is not a clinic at all, its deceptive practices are
afforded the greatest possible protection as ideological free speech. This is an
absurd outcome, given how underhanded CPCs are about revealing their
ideological underpinnings.
To correct this imbalance, it would have been wise for the Supreme Court
to adopt the perspective of the objective listener of the compelled disclosures
ZCen deter.ining C,Z t, HlassifW !6!s’ s*eeHC. TCis Z,uld Ca'e been a better
way to balance the free speeHC rigCts ,f ,rganiVati,ns against tCe *ubliH’s need
to understand who exactly is speaking to them. Political organizations such as
CPCs should not be allowed to hide behind their ideology to deceive
unsuspecting individuals. Unfortunately, at present this is not a practical
solution. It is not reasonable to expect injured women to wait until the Supreme
Court revisits or overrules its NIFLA precedent.
There are already tools at the disposal of our prosecutors and agency
regulators which can help to provide some protection for pregnant women.
Consumer protection statutes could restrict the deceptive advertising practices of
CPCs. State laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of medicine could be
enf,rHedS as IeZ ^,rA’s att,rneW general is atte.*ting t, do. FDA enforcement
aHti,ns H,uld HCi* aZaW at tCe !6!’s use ,f P_#-approved medical devices in
non-approved ways. But each of these existing tools requires the political will of
elected and appointed officials. And so far, there are very few of these leaders
who are willing to spend the political capital to protect pregnant women from
deceptive CPCs. This has left the injured pregnant women with very little
recourse.
Following basic tort remedies of compensatory damages, these injured
pregnant women should be compensated for their pain and suffering, any
resulting lost wages or income, and any other reasonable financial damages that
stem from the battery, such as increased medical expenses from delayed
diagnosis of pregnancy complications, or even wrongful deatC if tCe !6!’s
conduct results in the unwanted death of the fetus.251 Additionally, where the
CPCs deliberately defrauded these women to gain access to their bodies, these
women would also be good candidates for punitive damages, which would help
to fund tCe litigati,n and att,rneW’s fees.
We must fight to reclaim informed consent. It is not a meaningless tool to
shoehorn ideology through. It is not an amorphous concept, which allows a
pseudo-clinic to make a woman think she is being treated medically, when she
is actually being persuaded to submit to a religious ideology. By returning to the
roots of the informed consent doctrine, suing for the intentional tort of battery,
251. P,r tCe sa.e reas,ns disHussed ab,'e related t, DZr,ngful birtC3 Hlai.sS supra notes 196-198
and accompanying text, states are not likely to allow for damages from the resulting birth of a child, even
ZCere tCe !6!’s deHe*ti'e *raHtiHes led a Z,.an t, delaW reHei'ing an ab,rti,n until after it is *r,Cibited
by the state.
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victims of the misleading practice of CPCs can obtain personal redress. In the
absence of proper public enforcement, tort law emerges as our last and best
resort. And while tort law is scattershot and ex post, it can nonetheless provide
.eaningful and neHessarW regulati,n ,f !6!s’ deHe*ti'e beCa'i,r.
